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CHAPTER ONE
ANCIENT REFLECTIONS ON IDENTITY AND ITS PROBLEMS*
A STUDY OF ARISTOTLE ’3 VIEWS
§1 Introduction
There is a principle that states:
JLZ. ^ and y are identical, then every attribute of
the one is an attribute of the other
Often called "Leibniz's Law," or "one-half of Leibniz's Law,"
the principle does not seem to be due to Leibniz at all.
Scholarly investigations of late have turned up no evidence
that II (the Indiscernibility of Identicals) is among the
principles asserted by that philosopher. 1 Some—myself included'
have thought the principle due to Aristotle. Specifically,
Aristotle's discussion of numerical sameness in Topica contains
some remarks that suggest very strongly that he there subscribes
to a principle indistinguishable from II .
Now an interesting discussion occurs in De_ Sophisticis
Elenchis (hereafter "SE" ) , c. 24, at 179a27-b7, which work
was written, it is generally believed, at about the same time
as Topica . The discussion is interesting because it concerns
a certain fallacious argument, due to the Sophists, which
raises an apparent difficulty for II . Aristotle purports
to expose the fallacy in the argument but does so in a way
that implies a retraction of some views expressed in Topica .
The Sophists' argument, as I shall construct it, holds that
(P) Coriscus and the approaching man are identical. I know
Coriscus. I do not know the approaching man.
implies
1
2(C) I know and do not know the same man.
X should remark at once that Aristotle has no word for "identical."
However, "rocurov" ("same") is used sometimes by him to express
something like, if not exactly, the sense of "identical." This
sense is expressed, for example, in Aristotle's use of "tcv Glvt'ov "
("the same man") in the sentence of which (c) is the translation
(SjE 179M) • I make the simplifying assumption that "raurov" is
used on these occasions to express exactly the sense of "identical."
On this assumption, then, we have the means within Aristotle's
language to express the sense of (p).
Thus, in Aristotle's writings we find what seems to be
a formulation of the Iniiscernibility of Identicals (il), as
well as a confrontation with a certain kind of argument that
2is problematic if 11 is accepted as an intuitively valid nrinciple.
Recently, a study by Nicholas P. White of Aristotle's views
on sameness has appeared in print, ^ which study represents the
most thorough scholarship to date on the topics dealt with in
this chapter. The present discussion owes much to White's
researches, but theses are put forward here which are contrary
to some of those advanced by White. White's study is edifying
and valuable, but some details of his exposition seem to me
mistaken. Of these, I shall argue, one is his thesis that
in SB, c. 24 (and elsewhere), Aristotle puts a restriction on
II . The point is not a small one, for the thesis implies that,
in the passage in question, Aristotle does not hold that identity
implies indiscernibility . I shall argue that this consequence
is unfounded.
§ 2 White ' s Thesis
Although White believes that Aristotle's notion of numerical
sameness is only "something like" that of identity, he does not
3deny that in Toxica Aristotle annunciates a principle very much
llke H> and he does not attempt to distinguish this principle
from II. That is, White gives II to Aristotle. Actually,
White's formulation of the principle is:
LL If A and
J3 are identical, then whatever is true of
the one is true of the other
(I assume that "A" and "B" are variables for White. "Whatever"
is a quantifier, and I assume that "z is true of x" is equivalent
to "z is an attribute of x." In short, I assume that II and
LL are equivalent.)
But Aristotle does not long subscribe to the view that
identicals are indiscernible, if White's account is correct;
for Aristotle's refutation of the Sophists' argument is taken
by White to imply a retraction of that view. Wow I certainly
agree with White that Aristotle's answer to the Sophists betrays
a less than firm grasp of the concept of identity and that
certain truths asserted in Topica (in particular, at 103a29 ff.)
are apparently retracted. However, I do not believe that this
answer implies a retraction of the view that identicals are
indiscernible .
As implied, Aristotle's answer to the Sophists is taken
by White to signify an abandonment of II . More exactly, White
holds that in this passage Aristotle gives up II for a restricted
version of II. I shall call this "White's thesis." White cites
as evidence for his thesis a certain claim made by Aristotle
in the course of his refutation, to which claim I shall return
momentarily. Quite independently of this line of thought, however,
White includes a diagnosis of Aristotle's troubles, which seems
to me mistaken and which I would like to dispense with quickly.
4§ 3 Aristotle 1 s Conception of the Problem
tfhite says that in SE Aristotle "is worried ... about failures
of substitutivity of identity." 4 Now I certainly do not see
what bearing this contention has on the question at hand, unless
tfhite is using "substitutivity of identity" and "LL" as names
of one and the same principle. Reasons which lead one to
conjecture that these terms are being used to name the same
principle likewise lead one to wonder what this principle is.
The fact seems to be that two principles are simply being confused
throughout this portion of White's discussion. This is evidenced
by an earlier remark that in "precipitously giving his unrestricted
version of LL
,
Aristotle fails to take precautions against contexts
in which, as Quine puts it, extensionality fails, and runs the
risk of encountering paradoxes."^ The sense in which Aristotle's
Principle is unrestricted
, however, is the sense in which there
is no restriction on the kinds of attributes, or more literally,
predicables (ra KaTrjyopovfJ-CVa) that same things have in common,
as White had just finished informing us. One may formulate this
principle as LL, but one must beware that the result is still
a principle about things and attributes thereof, and not at all
about terms which may be substituted in some context. "Substitutivity
of identity," on the other hand, customarily names a principle
about interchangeability of terms, but no such principle has
been ascribed by White to Aristotle.
Nor does Aristotle give the slightest clue that he is aware
that the fallacy in the Sophists' argument turns on equivocal
interpretations of the context, "I know according to one
of which interpretations, (P) is true but is not the denial of
an instance of II. and hence does not imply (c) (for if (c)
follows from (P), then (c) follows from (p) by generalizing
on every occurrence of "Coriscus" and "the approaching man"
5in (P); but if (p) is true, then occurrences inside the context,
"I know cannot validly be generalized on); and according
to the other of which, (p) is the denial of an instance of II
and hence implies (c), but (p) is false. On the contrary,
Aristotle announces at the start that the fallacy is one that
depends on accident (an attribute), and his strategy in
^®i*^iing the Sophists is anticipated in the following statement
(l79a35-37): "For it is clear ... that it is not necessary
that what is true of the accident is true of the thing as well."
These and subsequent remarks convince me that the issues that
concern Aristotle here are genuinely issues of indiscernibility
.
When Aristotle says that he may know Coriscus and not know the
approaching man, he is saying that the attribute of being known
by him may be an attribute of Coriscus and not an attribute of
the approaching man. Consonant with his own usage, then, (p)
is the denial of an instance of II_. (p) therefore implies (c),
for (C) is just a generalization on (p).
Nor, I believe, does White disagree with this reading.
Indeed, he has made the same point: "As Aristotle sees it,
the problem is that one and the same thing would seem both to
have and to lack the attribute of being known by me."^ Moreover,
there is no doubt that Aristotle wants to avoid this problem.
That is, Aristotle wants to deny (c) and somehow tries to
show that (C) is not a valid conclusion from true premises.
§ 4 Difficulties for White
1 s Thesis
Yet an obvious difficulty arises for White's thesis if
everything I have just said is true. For it is just such
possibilities as that I know and do not know the same man
that LI excludes. But if Aristotle has given up II, then he
is free to affirm (C), for this possibility is no longer excluded
6After having stated Aristotle's problem, White says: "For this
reason, ^Aristotle/ gives in and puts a new sort of restriction
on LL." But if Aristotle does this, then he is no longer
committed to the view that identity implies indiscernibility
.
Since a restriction on a principle has the effect of excluding
from its provision something hitherto unexcluded, he is committed
to the view that some instances of identity—but not the view
that all instances of identity—imply indiscernibility. But
this view is compatible with the proposition that some identicals
are discernible. Consequently, that one and the same thing both
has and lacks the attribute of being known by him is not obviously
a problem for Aristotle, on these assumptions. This consequence
seems, however, clearly at variance with the facts. As White,
himself, appears to agree, Aristotle views the state of affairs
expressed by (c) as a problem, and one that he wants to avoid.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that White's thesis is
true. What, then, is Aristotle's strategy in refuting the Sophists?
I submit that there is none. On White's account of Aristotle's
moves, the restriction on II is intended to exclude from the
provision of the law identities that are accidental
,
like that
between Coriscus and the approaching man. But if indiscernibility
is only said to hold for some, nonaccidental, identicals, then
it is compatible with this restricted version of n that any
accidental identicals (like Coriscus and the approaching man)
are discernible. Consequently, it is compatible with this
principle that (p) is true, and nothing in White's account
prevents Aristotle from affirming (p). This leaves Aristotle
with no basis for refuting the argument as unsound. But, as
we have already seen, (P) implies (C). Hence, Aristotle has
no basis for refuting the argument.
7§ 5 Counterthesis
My previous remarks do not of course prove that White's
thesis is false. Nor do I suppose that I can prove the thesis
false. However, a number of considerations seem to me to favor
the countert he s i s . There is, for one, the matter of giving a
satisfactory account of Aristotle's counterargument in the
passage under consideration. The puzzle in the Sophists'
argument is that we seem to deduce from an apparently true
premise an impossible conclusion; namely, that identicals are
discernible. If Aristotle has given up II, then it does not
follow that this conclusion is, for him, an impossible conclusion.
Yet, if it is possible that identicals are discernible, then
there is no puzzle. It is easy to construct a valid inference
to the conclusion that I know and do not know the same man.
Let the premise be (P), above, as presently interpreted.
Moreover, there are no grounds for concluding that Aristotle
does not, in this passage, hold II to be a valid principle.
The statement which White takes as evidence for the proposition
that Aristotle puts a restriction on I_I (and hence gives up II)
is evidence for a different proposition, in my judgment; and
I shall presently defend that judgment. There is, on the other
hand, evidence in this passage that Aristotle does hold II to
be a valid principle. That evidence is in the form of Aristotle's
unwillingness to allow that one and the same thing is discernible:
both has and lacks the attribute of being known by him. On the
presumably safe assumption that Aristotle follows up trivial
consequences of his beliefs and is rational with respect to his
beliefs, then what Aristotle affirms is that same things (in
this sense of "same") are indiscernible. But that notion of
sameness is just the notion of identity
8White's thesis is based on a certain kind of claim made
by Aristotle in this passage and elsewhere. Let White state
his own case :
^ristotle_7 retreats from saying without qualification
that if A_ and 13 are the same, then whatever is true of
the one is true of the other. Rather, he maintains (to
use his manner of putting it) that the same things belong
only to things which are without difference and one in
{substance (rcU Kara rr)v ovcCav a&tctcpcpoLS ;<al fv oZcIv).
This contention clearly retracts some of what has been
said at l52b_25-29j I52a33~37 (and an apparent application
of the former at 133b_31 ff.).°
Row I agree that Aristotle is putting a restriction, here,
on some indiscernibility principle, but not the Indiscernibility
of Identicals
. Rather, the restriction must be one on the
Indiscernibility of Sames ; that is, on:
00 If x and y are the same in number, then every attribute
of the one is an attribute of the other
Note that it will not do to argue that since (a) and II are
indistinguishable propositions (more or less assumed by White
and me), then, since Aristotle puts a restriction on (A), then
Aristotle puts a restriction on II; for while (A) and II may be
indistinguishable propositions, it does not follow that Aristotle
knows this. Indeed, the whole point of the restriction, if I
am right, is that Aristotle now believes that the notions of
numerical sameness and identity are distinguishable
.
As I see the situation, Aristotle is struggling, here,
and in Physics
,
at 2l2bl4-l6, with the problem of the conditions
of identity . Put Aristotle has no word for "identity." In
Topica
,
identity is conceived as sameness in number, and he
there announces the principle (a). In SE, Aristotle confronts
the Sophists' argument, and it is possible to speculate that,
failing to see where the fallacy in the argument really lies,
9his grip on the notion of identity begins to weaken. He continues
to hold, as I have argued, that identity implies indiscernibility
,
but he no longer continues to hold that simple numerical sameness’
is identity. Some things are the same in number, but only
accidentally. Eecause, it now seems to him, things that are
accidentally the same are discernible
, these, he now wants to
say, are not identical. What he says is that these are not
one in substance (?v OUCflv) and that only things which are one
in substance are indiscernible. The implication of the latter
pronouncement for (A) is that a qualification, or restriction,
is necessary:
^ and y are one (the same in number) in substance,
then every attribute of the one is an attribute of
the other
In SE, then, identity is conceived as sameness in number in substance.
Thus, what were correctly taken to be identities in Topica
,
at 103a29 ff
.
,
are now no longer so taken. Aristotle thus refutes
the Sophists by denying the identity of Ccriscus and the approaching
man; hence, the truth of (p). At the same time, he advances a
new analysis of identity, resulting in the principle (A'). And
although it is difficult to see how the antecedent of (a*) can
rule out as identical things that are accidentally the same
(like Coriscus and the approaching man), it is Aristotle’s
intention that it does. This seems to me the most plausible
reading of this difficult passage.
v6 Conclusion
Let me review what I have been saying. I have been saying,
in agreement with White, that Aristotle's answer to the Sophists
in SE is a sign that his grasp of the concept of identity is less
10
firm nere than it is in Topica
; but, in disagreement with White,
that this answer is not a sign that Aristotle has abandoned II.
I have argued that the thesis that Aristotle gives up II for a
restricted version thereof misrepresents his counterargument in
Accordingly
,
I have proposed an alternative account of this
counterargument, which seems virtually to force itself upon us.
Aristotle concludes his discussion by saying (l79b?-4) that it
is not the case that if he knows Coriscus and does not know the
approaching man, then he knows and does not know the same man.
Thus, Aristotle says, in effect, but in the clearest of terms,
that the inference from the last two conjuncts of (p) to (o') is
invalid. But the inference from the whole of (p) to (c) is
valid, and unmistakably so (for, on the present account, "same”
in (C) has the sense of "identical," and (p) is the denial of
an instance of II). If Aristotle views (c) as impossible, then
he must view (P) as impossible also. Since Aristotle grants
that Coriscus may have an attribute which the approaching man
lacks, then he must be denying their identity. He does deny
that they are one in substance and asserts that only things
which are one in substance are indiscernible
. The more reasonable
conclusion to draw, then, is not that things are now conceived
to be identical in different ways, but that the notion of identity
has changed.
^
11
NOTES FOR CHAPTER I
See, especially, Fred Feldman, '’Leibniz and Leibniz' Law ’’
The Philosophical Review
, 79 ( 1970 ), pp. 510-522.
2That the argument is problematic may justifiably be questioned,but I postpone a discussion of the question until Chapter II.
Nicholas P. White, "Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness,"
The Philosophical Review
, 80 (1971), pp. 177-197
^Ibid
.
,
p. 180.
^Ibid
. ,
p. 179.
There is some basis for doubting that "Ta KaTr]\opouj^€.va^
is translatable as "attributes." It is evident that Aristotle
does not always distinguish the language he mentions from the
language he uses. Perhaps he did not recognize the importance
of this distinction. One exegetical problem that results from
this practice is that^it is not clear, to me anyway, whether
Aristotle means by "ra KaT^opou/ACva, " in the present context,
attributes, predicate phrases, or a combination of both. One
predicable—definition (Acr/of)—is clearly a predicate phrase.
Thus, it is not clear to me whether Aristotle wishes to assert
II or
II«I If x and y are identical, then every predicate phrase
true of the one is true of the other
II *1 is an instance of II; that is, II implies II. 1, but not
conversely. However, if we assume (as White and I do) that
II is intuitively unchallengeable, then whether Aristotle
is committed to IT or to _II._1> neither principle is falsified
by the Sophists' argument that he attempts to refute in SB
,
at 179a?7-b7» For convenience, I shall suppose, along with
White, that Aristotle holds the broader principle II .
7White, ££. cit .
,
p. 179*
8„Idem .
9Idem .
"^1 wish to express my gratitude to Vere Chappell and
Gareth Matthews for helpful discussions on these topics, as
well as suggestions for improving an earlier draft.
CHAPTER TWO
THE NATURE OP THE PROBLEM
$ 1 Introduction
In this chapter I explore the nature of arguments like
the Sophists' argument. I call any argument that has as its
conclusion a paradox (as defined in §3) a "puzzle," until
such time as the paradox is discovered not to be an antinomy.
The common property of all puzzles under consideration here
is that their conclusions are paradoxical if the Indiscernibility
of Identicals (il) is accepted as an intuitively valid principle
and hence a nondisavowable principle.
Often the source of difficulty in paradox-yielding arguments
can be traced to some obscurity in the meaning of their constituent
sentences. It is this obscurity that induces the initial
affirmation of truth and deducibility, when falsehood or
nondeducibility is the case. Thus, we may say that the source
of paradoxicality in these cases is an obscurity in the
initial interpretation of the constituent sentences. Solutions
in these cases are gotten by interpreting the sentences in a
way that reconciles the argument with our intuitions about
truth and deducibility.
I speculate that Aristotle's troubles were due to problems
of interpretation. It appears certain that Aristotle mislocates
the obscurity in the Sophists' argument. He takes obscurity
to reside in the meaning of "ravrov," whereas it lay elsewhere.
It lay, as I prefer to view the matter, in semantical peculiarities
of its referential occurrences. I conclude the chapter with
an informal introduction to the distinction between what I call
"standard" and "nonstandard" referential occurrences.
12
13
§ 2 The Sophists 1 Argument Anew
In the previous chapter the question at issue was whether
Aristotle's answer to the Sophists in SE, c. 24, at 179a27-b7,
implies a rejection of II. Another, more difficult question,
which I have not attempted to answer, is whether Aristotle does
in fact there reject
_II. Although I have questioned the grounds
of the thesis (Nicholas P. White's) that Aristotle rejects II
in the passage in question, and proposed an alternative thesis
of my own, I have not claimed to have disproved or proved
either thesis. Aristotle's discussion is simply too imperspicuous
to this writer for him to presume to have a conclusive answer
to the second question.
In addition to its imperspicuity
,
the discussion omits
explicit mention of the "fallacy" in question. Some scholars
have supposed as given in the discussion that the relation
between Coriscus and the approaching man is one of identity.
But a number of considerations marshal against this supposition.
For one, Aristotle has no word for "identical." Aristotle
does have a word for "same", but it is compatible with theses
put forward in Chapter I that Aristotle may hold that Coriscus
and the approaching man are the same man, while denying that
they are identical. Such would be the case if Aristotle holds
that Coriscus and the approaching man are one in accident and
means by "6V ouJtV" ("one in substance") what we mean by
"identical." Moreover, whereas Aristotle can say that Coriscus
and the approaching man are the same man, he does not. In the
course of his refutation, Aristotle avoids specifying the
relation between Coriscus and the approaching man.
Nevertheless, if we do not assume that Coriscus and the
approaching man are even the same man, then there would appear
to be no fallacy to be refuted; no puzzle to be solved. I shall,
14
on that account, assume as given in the discussion that the
relation between Coriscus and the approaching man is one of
numerical sameness. Then, on this assumption, Aristotle
explicitly denies the implication to (c) from the premise
that Coriscus has an attribute which the approaching man
lacks, while implicitly granting that Coriscus and the
approaching man are (in some sense) the same man. That is,
Aristotle denies that (c) is implied by
(P ) Coriscus and the approaching man are the same man.
I know Coriscus. I do not know the approaching man.
In the previous chapter, discussion was facilitated by
taking the Sophists' argument to contain the premise (p).
In this chapter, my concern is very much with the way in
which the Sophists’ argument presented itself to Aristotle,
and where (p) contains "identical," the original premise
shall be assumed to contain some grammatical form of the
ubiquitous "rcrurcv" ("same"). Accordingly, I shall henceforward
speak of the Sophists' argument as the argument that (p»
)
implies (c).
I shall be concerned, in part, in this chapter with
the question, why Aristotle failed to dispatch the puzzle
in a satisfactory way. We can answer this question in ways
widely varying in cognitive signif icance . A species of the
more significant variety is preferred here, for which I shall
want an answer to the prior question, why the Sophists'
argument, and any argument of that ilk, is a puzzle in the
first place.
§ 3 Puzzles and Paradoxes
It will be worthwhile to explore the nature of Aristotle's
puzzle, for it is a puzzle of a kind that will occupy permanent
15
interest. To this end I shall, for the moment, talk of paradoxes
rather than puzzles. Specifically, I shall talk of paradoxes,
as that term is understood in W. V. Quine's "The Ways of Paradox." 1
In that essay Quine provides clear and useful characterizations
of three kinds of paradox, of which antinomies are hut one.
As there and here conceived, a paradox is any statement that
at first seems absurd, hut for which statement there is an
argument that at first seems to sustain it; that is, the premise
does not seem to be one that we can disavow, and the reasoning
does not seem to he fallacious. Paradoxes, then, are conclusions
of arguments. So understood, we can speak of (c), in the
Sophists' argument, as a paradox; for (c) seems at first (and
is) absurd, and (c) is the conclusion of an argument that
seems at first to sustain it.
Let us now characterize more precisely the kinds of paradox
that (c) may he. (c) is either: (l) not deducihle from a
premise by accepted ways of reasoning; ( 2 ) deducihle by accepted
ways of reasoning from a disavowahle premise; or (3) deducihle
by accepted ways of reasoning from a ncndisavowable premise.
If (c) is (l), then (c) is said to be a "falsidical paradox."
If (C) is ( 2 ), then we are instructed to view paradoxicality
as attaching to the denial of the premise. To deny the premise
seems at first absurd, but there is a sound argument to sustain
the denial. The denied premise is called a "veridical (truth-
telling) paradox." Finally, if (c) is (3), then (c) is called,
in familiar parlance, an "antinomy."
The general idea of a puzzle is that it is any situation,
sentence, or set of sentences, that calls for an explanation,
but which explanation is hidden. Clearly, some arguments that
have paradoxes as their conclusions satisfy these conditions.
In particular, every argument that has a paradox as its conclusion,
prior to the discovery that that paradox is (l), ( 2 ), or (3),
16
above, satisfies these conditions. Every such argument, then,
will be called a puzzle. So understood, we can speak of the
Sophists
• argument as a puzzle, prior to the discovery that
(C) is (1), ( 2 ), or (3).
It is not true, however, that every argument that has
a paradox as its conclusion ceases to be a puzzle as soon as
this discovery is made. Explanations remain hidden in the
case of antinomies. It is for this reason that antinomies
"bring on the crises in thought." 2 The discovery that a
paradox is (1) or (2), on the other hand, occasions no such
crisis and, on the contrary, ceases to occasion puzzlement.
Note ought to be taken of the special case in which a
conclusion is discovered to be (3), but the pattern of
reasoning involved in its derivation is easily given up.
The antinomy (if it is appropriate to call it such) is
thereby inactivated, and in this case, also, the argument
ceases to occasion puzzlement. Such cases will be assimilated
to the category of falsidical paradoxes, since the class
of accepted ways of reasoning is adjusted accordingly.
I shall say that an argument with a paradox as its
conclusion ceases to be a puzzle, when and only when that
paradox is shown to be (l) or (2). What I have just said
implies that false explanations do not dispatch puzzles
of the paradox-yielding variety. Should it be argued,
for example, that a paradox is falsidical, owing to a
fallacy at step Q, whereas the paradox is falsidical,
but the fallacy does not occur at step Q, the paradox
has not been shown to be (l), and thus the argument does
not cease to be a puzzle. This usage is a matter of
preference. I prefer to think that philosophical puzzles
persist, as long as true explanations remain hidden.
17
§ 4 Aristotle 1 s Problems of Interpretation
As argued in ^2, Aristotle would seem to have to suppose
that Coriscus and the approaching man are, in some sense, the
same man. And we Know that Aristotle supposes that he knows
Coriscus and does not know the approaching man. But I have
already cited evidence that Aristotle interprets the sentence,
of which "I know Coriscus and do not know the approaching man"
is the translation, as expressing the discernibility of Coriscus
and the approaching man; that is, the proposition that Coriscus
has the attribute of being known by him, and the approaching
man lacks this attribute. Therefore, Aristotle would appear
to be committed to the supposition that the same man both has
and lacks the attribute of being known by him. Cn this last
statement, White and I are in agreement. Yet this supposition
seems to be indistinguishable from the proposition expressed
by (C), and Aristotle also appears to be arguing that the
inference from (P' ) to (C) is fallacious. This is an oddity
of which neither White’s account nor my own provides an
easy explanation.
If my account is correct, (p* ) expresses, on Aristotle's
interpretation, a contingent proposition, but (P' ) is not an
instance of (C). If my account is correct, Aristotle concludes
that (C) is falsidical, owing to an equivocation on "same".
Coriscus and the approaching man are the same in accident
,
but not the same in. substance ; but the sense of "same" in (C)
is that of "same in substance."
This may seem an incredible interpretation, and Aristotle
is certainly not explicit about any of this, but it is the
most plausible reading I can give to the passage. I should
add that the above presentation of Aristotle's refutation
accords with White's account no less well than with my own.
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The accounts diverge only on the question whether Aristotle
conceives sameness in accident as identity; to be exact,
accidental identity. I have taken the fact that sameness
in accident does not, according to Aristotle, imply indiscernibility
to suggest that the sense of "same” in (p* ) is taken by Aristotle
to be neither quite the sense of "identical" nor quite the sense
of "similar," but a sense intermediate between the two. If,
on the other hand, Aristotle does take the sense of "same"
in (P'
)
to be that of "identical," then ray account is wrong,
and White's account is probably correct. Then "same man"
in (C) is short for "identical in substance ."
A contemporary account of the Sophists' argument would
hold that the argument is a puzzle
,
only if (?'
)
can be
interpreted otherwise than as expressing discernibility.
(Doubtless, some will insist that (P'
)
can not be interpreted
otherwise; hence, that there is no puzzle. I return to
this question at the end of §5*) A contemporary will argue
that, if the Sophists' argument has a paradox as its conclusion,
then (c) is indeed a falsidical paradox; but the fallacy is
not due to any equivocation on "same". Rather, (c) is not
a valid deduction from (P' ) because the referring expressions,
"Coriscus" and "the approaching man," cannot be validly
generalized on inside the context, "I know ...," owing to
the absence of certain semantical properties on the part of
these expressions, which properties are necessary for
generalizing. The absence of these properties is ordinarily
taken to show that the expressions do not refer in the
standard (usual) way: the way in which expressions refer
when they occur inside so-called "extensional contexts."
I am not convinced, however—and there is surely no
evidence in SB
,
c. 24—that Aristotle had a clear grasp of
the sense in which (P' ) does not express discernibility.
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Nor does this seem to me to be so surprising, for the idea
that referring expressions may fail on some occasions to refer
in their usual way is an idea of unusual subtlety (not that
Aristotle was not capable of unusual subtlety). Suppose, for
the sake of argument, that it is true that Aristotle understood
the sentence of which (p* ) is the translation in this singular
way. This would go some distance toward accounting for a
number of things. Together with what I have already said,
it accounts for the evident weakening in hi3 grip on the
notion of identity and therewith the solution itself. For,
in conjunction with the present supposition, evidence
—some
of which is rehearsed in the first paragraph of this section-
supports the hypotheses that Aristotle interprets the sentence
of which (P*
)
is the translation, in what was perhaps the
natural way, as contingent ; and that he interprets the
sentence of which (c) is the translation, in the natural
way, as necessarily false .
The combination of a reading of (c) as necessarily false,
a reading of (p*
)
as contingent, and a reading of (p»
)
as
expressing discernibility, would reasonably produce considerable
tension for any philosopher bent upon refuting the inference
from (P 1 ) to (c). Indeed, this formidable combination excludes
as plausible sources of difficulty everything in the argument
except "same" in (P
'
)
.
If he is to prove the argument fallacious,
Aristotle must view the sense of "same M in (p 1 ) as different
from the sense of "same" in (C). This he apparently does
by construing the sameness of Coriscus and the approaching man
as accidental
,
and the sameness of this man and that man as
substantial
,
if it obtains (cf
.
"x" and "y" in the symbolization
of (C) as "(Ex)(Ey)(x and y are the same man. I know x.
I do not know y)").
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Aristotle's account bears an interesting similarity to
many contemporary accounts, which construe "Coriscus = the
approaching man" as contingent
, and "x = y" as necessary
,
if sat isf iable
. The important difference between the two
accounts is, of course, that Aristotle construes as accidental
or substantial the relation of sameness; whereas the contemporary
construes as contingent or necessary the sentence expressing
the relation of sameness. But the consequences of Aristotle's
distinction for the concept of identity are upsetting; for
numerically same things are, or are not, identical, on this
account, depending on how they are specified ?
On the assumption that my reconstruction of Aristotle's
refutation is correct, then the argument that (c) is a falsidical
paradox, owing to equivocation, can be seen to turn on the
soundness of an argument for a veridical paradox; namely, that
numerical sameness and identity are different relations (although
Aristotle would express the conclusion differently; namely, that
numerical sameness does not imply indiscernibility ) . Since
Coriscus and the approaching man are the same in number, then
it seems true to say that they are identical (that is,
indiscernible); but Aristotle has an argument to show that
they are not identical, absurd as this conclusion at first
seems.
Having described Aristotle's puzzle and his solution
in these technical terms, it is now also possible to state
in a succinct way our counterargument to this solution: If
the statement that numerical sameness is not identity is a
veridical paradox, then, by definition, there is a sound
argument to sustain the paradox. Aristotle does produce
an argument for his conclusion, but this argument depends
upon the premise that things are not identical if they are
the same only accidentally
,
a premise that seems counterintuitive.
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As a postscript to the preceding discussion, we might
consider, at least, the question whether Aristotle took the
Sophists' argument to have proved an antinomy, which he presumed
to have eliminated hy eliminating (a) as a logical principle.
The question whether (c) was an antinomy, originally, is one
for which I assume no answer is known. We are not told what
then-accepted pattern of reasoning, if any, the Sophists took
their argument to invalidate. However, it is not implausible
to suppose that the Sophists, like Aristotle, mistakenly
supposed that (p« ) invalidated (a). At any rate
,
Aristotle's
discussion suggests no flaws with accepted ways of reasoning,
and this suggests that (A) is not here taken to be an accepted
principle
.
§ 5 Standard and Nonstandard Referential Occurrences
An Informal Introduction
Not uncommonly, the hidden explanations sought by puzzle-
solvers are hidden by being obscured by the way in which a
situation is presented. Popular riddles typically have this
feature. Often it is possible to trace the source of difficulty
in paradox-yielding arguments to some obscurity in the meaning
of their constituent sentences. It is this obscurity that
induces the initial affirmation of truth and deducibility,
when falsehood or nondeducibility is the case. Thus, we may
say that the source of paradoxicality in these cases is an
obscurity in the initial interpretation of the constituent
sentences. Solutions in these cases are gotten by interpreting
the sentences in a way that reconciles the argument with our
intuitions about truth and deducibility. That is, the
conclusions of the arguments turn out, under the interpretations,
to be (1) or (2), as defined in
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Aristotle, as we have seen, traces the source of difficulty
10 t
,
h6
/
Sophlsts ' argument to an obscurity in the meaning of
"tqutov" ("same"); and he solves the puzzle by interpreting
(P') in such a way that it does not imply the conclusion.
But it seems true to say that in construing (P'
)
as he does,
Aristotle misconceives the puzzle before him.
Prom our privileged vantage point it is easy to see where
Aristotle went awry. In a word, he mislocated the obscurity
in the presentation. He took obscurity to reside in the meaning
of "raurov," whereas it lay elsewhere. It lay, as I prefer to
view the matter, in semantical peculiarities of its referential
occurrences.
Obscurity in modes of presentation is effected in various
ways, but in the case of puzzles of the kind here being considered,
it is effected by having within the presentation no sign
distinguishing one kind of referential occurrence from another.
There are, on the one hand, standard referential occurrences
and, on the other, nonstandard referential occurrences. By
an expression's having "standard referential occurrence" in
some context, I mean that the expression refers and moreover
refers, in that context, in "the standard way." By an
expression's reterring in "the standard way," I mean that
the expression refers directly to its object. An expression
has standard referential occurrence in some context if it
has what Frege calls "direct" (" gerade " ) occurrence
,
3
and
what Quine calls "purely referential occurrence."^ By an
expression ' s having "nonstandard referential occurrence" in
some context, I mean that the expression either does not
refer or does not refer, in that context, in the standard
way.
The problem posed by nonstandard referential occurrences
is that nonstandard referential occurrences are not always
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self-i ientifying. An expression that has standard referential
occurrence, in one context, may not he, at first, semantically
distinguishable from itself as it has, in some other context,
a nonstandard referential occurrence. Whence arises paradoxes
.
But this is not always the case. Any expression occurring
within quotation marks is semantically distinguishable from
itself as it occurs outside quotation marks. We know that the
references of "nine" are not identical in the sentences,
•'Nine is less than ten," and "'Nine* is the name of a number;"
and we know that "nine" has a standard referential occurrence
in the first sentence and a nonstandard referential occurrence
in the second sentence.
There are obvious advantages to having within a language
the means for distinguishing standard from nonstandard referential
occurrences. Moreover, natural languages do normally possess
some procedure or other for making such distinctions, when it
_is clear that the intended reference s are distinct
. Numbers
are clearly different from names, and so too are television
programs from Presidents. But whereas we have a solid intuitive
criterion for telling when expressions have nonstandard referential
occurrence, it is an unsolved philosophical problem whether the
two occurrences of "Coriscus" in (p‘
)
have distinct references.
If, however, the expressions "Coriscus" and "the approaching
man" are taken to refer in their standard way everywhere in (P')>
then there is no ambiguity about the references of these
expressions. "Coriscus" refers everywhere in (P'
)
to Coriscus,
and "the approaching man" refers everywhere in (P 1 ) to the
approaching man. And, from all indications, this is how
Aristotle took the referring expressions in (P'
)
to refer.
Aristotle had been led astray by construing (implicitly, I
assume) the referring expressions in (P* ) as referring in their
standard way. "I know ..." came thus to he viewed as expressing
24
an attribute of one of the references (Coriscus) and not an
attribute of the other (the approaching man). Aristotle
concluded that since Coriscus and the approaching man are
discernible, they are not identical. The reasoning is beyond
reproach, but the premise, we are inclined to say, is false.
The discovery of nonstandard referential occurrences
seems to be a rather late development in the history of
philosophy. This is, however, not so surprising when we
realize that only lately have philosophers come to recognize
the great importance of language to their proper concerns.
The philosophy of language, in the contemporary sense of the
phrase, began with Frege; and in Frege’s writings we find,
as far as I know, the first recognition that puzzles like the
one in Sh_, c. 24, are due to the phenomenon of nonstandard
referential occurrence.
In the following chapter I shall set forth some of the
most influential of contemporary solutions to puzzles like
that of Aristotle's. The common property of all of these
puzzles is that they yield paradoxical conclusions, if the
Indiscernibility of Identicals (il) is accepted as an
intuitively valid principle and hence a nondisavowable
principle. The validity of that principle is at issue
until such time as each paradox is discovered not to be
an antinomy. Aristotle's solution to the Sophists' argument
did not, therefore, if my account is correct, settle the
issue of the validity of II . Aristotle's explanation
presumably relieved the situation of puzzlement, from
Aristotle's point of view; but in the sense of "philosophical
puzzle" characterized earlier, the philosophical puzzle
remains, since Aristotle's explanation is not a true
explanation
.
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Before proceeding to contemporary solutions to puzzles
like that of Aristotle's, I want to consider the question
whether Aristotle's puzzle belongs to this collection. Some
may contend that the Sophists' argument is not a puzzle; that
there is simply no intelligible way of construing (p*
)
such
that it is true. I am not persuaded that this is so; nor
do I see how one could give a conclusive argument for the
claim. One argument that will not do is that the Sophists'
argument is not a puzzle that results from nonstandard
referential occurrence, because expressions that have
nonstandard referential occurrence always occur inside
subordinate sentences
. Two objections to this argument
can be raised. One is that the premise of the argument is
simply not true, for as is well known, quotation forms a
singular term
,
within which a referring expression always
has nonstandard referential occurrence. The second objection
is that the argument presupposes that the grammatical form
of (P') dictates its logical form (whereof more in Chapter III)
But the correct analysis of the direct—object construction
"a knows b" may be such that "b" does occur inside a
subordinate sentence. Jaakko Hintikka, for example,
analyzes "a knows b" as "(3x) a knows that (b = x),"
where "(3x)" is interpreted as a quantifier relying on
a method of identification by acquaintance.^ I am inclined
to think that something like Hintikka' s analysis is correct.
I"t is true that if we do not subscribe to an analysis of
"a knows b" in terms of "knows that then (p 1 )
cannot be formulated in accordance with Russell's theory
of descriptions in any way that does not imply a contradiction,
given ordinary laws of quantification theory.^ That, of course
cannot be viewed as a conclusive reason for (P')'s having no
sense that is contingent and indeed could be viewed as
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evidence that a Hintikka-like analysis is correct.
What seems undeniable to me is that Aristotle's puzzlement
was occasioned by the same phenomenon that would occasion
puzzlement in a contemporary, were that contemporary presented
with the argument that
(P~) Coriscus = the approaching man. Aristotle knows that
Coriscus is musical. Aristotle does not know that
the approaching man is musical
implies
(C*) (Bx )(Ey)(x = y . Aristotle knows that x is musical.
Aristotle does not know that y is musical)
I shall speak of the argument from (p*) to (c*) as "the Coriscus
puzzle." The Coriscus puzzle poses an initial threat to the
intuitive validity of II_, just as (on present speculation) Aristotle
took the Sophists' argument to pose an initial threat to the
intuitive validity of II . The Coriscus puzzle is free from
the difficulties connected with the Sophists' argument, and
it is to the Coriscus puzzle that all contemporary solutions
included in the following chapter apply.
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CHAPTER THREE
THREE THEORIES OP NONSTANDARD REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE:
THE CONTEMPORARY WAY OUT
§ 1 Referring Expressions—Grammatical Forms
Following Russell's account of a "denoting phrase," 1 I call
an expression of a natural language a "referring expression,"
solely in virtue of its form. However, I follow more closely
Strawson's conception and division of the forms that referring
expressions may take. 2 These are: (l) pronouns
. ( 2 ) proper
nouns, and (3) des criptive phrases (expressions beginning with
a definite article, followed by a noun—common or proper—qualified
or unqualified, in the singular). I do not presume that every
referring expression has one of these three forms but do presume
that every referring expression can be translated, without loss
of meaning, into an expression having one of these three forms
(for example, "Gray's Elegy" can be translated into the
descriptive phrase, ’’the Elegy which is Gray's").
In addition, I follow Russell in distinguishing three
cases of referring expressions: (l) those which have indefinite
or nonunique references, ( 2 ) those which have definite or
unique references, and (3) those which have no references.
Pronouns, alone, are those referring expressions which have
indefinite references. There are cases of referring expressions
which have unique references among both proper nouns and
descriptive phrases. Finally, there are cases of referring
expressions which have no references among all three categories
of referring expressions.
In this chapter, reference to expressions that refer shall
be understood not to include reference to pronouns
.
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^
2 D_ef inite descri ptions and Other Nongrammatical Forms
In the preceding section, a referring expression was defined
as an expression having a certain grammatical form. However,
reference in the literature to the forms of certain referring
expressions is not always reference to grammatical forms.
Referring expressions have grammatical forms and some other
kind of form (to which philosophers have apparently not seen
fit to give a name).
When Russell speaks of the form of a definite description
,
he means something other than what Strawson means hy the form
of a definite description. Strawson holds that a definite
description is an expression "beginning with the definite
article followed by a noun, qualified or unqualified, in the
singular (e.g., ’the table', 'the old man', 'the king of France')."^
Definite descriptions are therefore expressions having a certain
grammatical form, according to Strawson's account.
Russell seems to imply that definite descriptions are
grammatical forms when he says that a definite description is
an expression of the form "the so-and-so," but Russell also
wants to say that a definite description is an "incomplete
symbol," an expression of the form r ( ?x) (tfx)"1 . This last
form is not a grammatical form. As Leonard Linsky observes,^
"the table," a definite description on Strawson's account,
is not necessarily a definite description on Russell's account;
and this is easily shown by taking the sentence (Linsky' s),
"The table is the most important item of furniture in the
dining room." It would be an egregious error to symbolize
this sentence as "G(7x)Fx", for "G(7x)Fx" reads: "There is
(exists) an x such that x is F, and for all y, if y is F,
then y is identical with x, and x is G; or, more simply:
"There is exactly one thing x which is F, and x is G." But
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the sentence, "The table is the most important „„ cf furnlture
in the dining room," does not have the meaning of "There is
exactly one thing x which is a table, and x is the most important
item of furniture in the dining room .' 1
In this thesis a definite description will be understood
as an incomplete symbol, in Russell's sense: an expression of
the form r (?x)(<£x)~\ A definite description is therefore not
simply a grammatical form. Thus, a descriptive phrase fas
defined in }l) is not necessarily a definite description.
Russell's notion of a definite description has semantical as
well as grammatical import. A definite description has the
grammatical form of a descriptive phrase, but one and the same
descriptive phrase (for example, ''the table") may be a definite
description on one occasion of use and not a definite description
on another. So a definite description is defined, in cart,
by usage. A definite description is a descriptive phrase which
is used purportedly to refer to some (nonintensional
) object,
some thing. Finally, a definite description is said to have
no "meaning in isolation ," 5 no "significance on its own account ." 6
This last condition is at once the most difficult to understand
and at the same time the most crucial to the distinction
between definite descriptions and names
. For, at least in theory,
there are names which have the grammatical form of a descriptive
phrase ('the morning star," perhaps), and names are used
purportedly to refer to things. But only a name, according
to Russell, has meaning on its own account; that is, in
isolation from any sentence in which it may occur. Thus,
a name, like a definite description, is not simply a grammatical
form, but is an expression that satisfies certain semantical
conditions. Thus, a proper noun (as defined in jl) is not
necessarily a name.
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I am not concerned to explore the intricacies of Russell's
notions of a definite description and a name. What is important
for my concerns is that a definite description is an incomplete
symbol, an expression of the form r (7z)(<J*J\ and that a name
is not an incomplete symbol, but an expression of some other
nongrammatical form. What is important for my concerns is
Russell's analysis of sentences containing referring expressions
For the distinctions in the analyses of these sentences may
be viewed as corresponding to the distinctions in the ways
in which the referring expressions refer in the sentences,
according to Russell's theory.
§ 3 Names
Although both names and definite descriptions may have
unique references, names and definite descriptions never refer
in the same way, according to Russell's theory. In Russell's
theory, every name refers in what I am calling the "standard-
way. ^very occurrence of a name is a "standard referential
occurrence." In other theories of reference that we shall
discuss, it is not true that every occurrence of a name (in
the theory) is a standard referential occurrence. Nevertheless,
the general idea of a name is the same in each of these theories
Russell says that a name is "a simple symbol, directly
designating an individual which is its meaning, and having
this meaning in its own right, independently of the meanings
of all other words." I shall disregard everything in this
statement except the claim that a name is a simple symbol.
Unless a referring expression is a simple symbol, Russell
tells us, it cannot occur as the "subject" of any "logical
form": a sentence resulting from semantical analysis (the
notion of logical form is explored more fully in ^4).
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I shall assume (apparently along with Russell) that every
referring expression (pronouns included) Is either a "simple"
symbol or an incomplete symbol, In his sense. I shall then
define a ’'name" as follows:
(Def. 1) A referring expression a is a name in a language L,
if and only if ( 1 ) a has, in L, a unique reference,
and (2) a. is not an incomplete symbol in L
(bef. 1) adequately defines a name in every theory of reference—
or, every language L prescribed by that theory—discussed on these
pages.
Relativization of namehood to a language is necessary,
since one and the same referring expression may be an incomplete
symbol in one language and not an incomplete symbol in another.
"Conscus" and "the approaching man" will be names in one
language and not names in another.
We must still distinguish standard referential occurrences
of names from nonstandard referential occurrences of names.
We must do so, that is, if we are to describe adequately those
theories that (1) construe every referring expression which
has a unique reference as a "simple" symbol and hence a name,
and (2) account for the Coriscus puzzle and other puzzles of
that ilk in a way that does not conflict with our intuition
that II is intuitively valid. One method is to distinguish
occurrences of the same name; another is to distinguish some
name s from others. In this section I shall consider the
second method only.
In some, but not all, theories that countenance nonstandard
referential occurrence on the part of names, some names are
singled out as always referring in the standard way. That is,
for any occurrence of the name in any sentence of the language
prescribed by that theory, that occurrence is a standard referential
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occurrence. It would be congenial to call names that always
refer in the standard way, according to some theory,
-standard
names;- but this term has a technical meaning not congenial to
the distinction between standard and nonstandard referential
occurrences. If one imagines a language of mixed modalities
(necessity and belief contexts, for example), then a standard
name may refer in the standard way on one occasion (in contexts
of necessity) but not on another (in contexts of belief).
I might follow an old custom and call names that always refer
in the standard way, according to some theory,
-logically
proper names;- but this term, too, seems to have a technical
meaning not altogether congenial to the distinction between
standard and nonstandard referential occurrences. It is
generally used to designate a referring expression open to
substitution and generalization (roughly speaking) and to
distinguish these referring expressions from others which
are not. But, in Frege's theory, names which do not refer
directly to their objects—hence, names which do not refer
m the standard way—nevertheless must be said to be open
to substitution and generalization, once disambiguation has
been effected. I propose
-standard proper name- as a
designation of names which, according to some theory,
always refer in the standard way. Thus, every name, in
Russell's theory, is a standard proper name.
My use of the term "standard proper name- will be
limited. Not every theory of reference discussed in this
thesis countenances the existence of such names. But the
logical behavior displayed by such names is the criterion
of standard referential occurrence and consequently is of
great importance. What this logical behavior consists in
I am not yet prepared to state with any exactness. However,
for the present, a standard proper name may be defined as
follows
:
35
(Bef
. 2) A referring expression a is a standard proper
name in a language L, if and only if (1) a is
a name in L, and (2) for any occurrence of a
in any sentence of L, that occurrence is a
standard referential occurrence in L
Like namehood, standard proper namehood must be relativised
to a language; for one and the same referring expression may be
a standard proper name in one language and not a standard proper
name in another. '.Nine" will be a standard proper name in one
language and not a standard proper name in another.
J 4 Logical Form;
In "On Denoting," Russell says:
If I say 'Scott was a man,' that is a statement of the
and it has . Scott , for its sub;ject<man
form *x was a
But if I say the author of Steve rley was a man,' thatis not a statement of the form *x was a man,' and doesnot have 'the author of Waver ley ' for its subject.
8
The distinction that Russell makes here is one between what
he calls the "logical forms" of sentences containing names
(that is, standard proper names) and sentences containing
definite descriptions.
forms are best thought of as sentences of a
formal language, which sentences are interpreted by a semantical
theory in the desired way (the way desired by, for example,
a theory of reference). Now Russell's examples of logical
forms are not sentences of any formal language, but I have
not said that what is best thought of as a logical form is
what Russell meant by a logical form. Still, his example
of the logical form (in his sense) of an English sentence
containing a standard proper name will serve as a prototype
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Of the logical form (in our sense) of an English sentence
containing a standard proper name.
Logical forms are creatures of semantical analysis.
In particular, theories of reference are concerned with the
semantical analysis of occurrences of referring expressions
within certain English arguments and with the manner in which
these occurrences are to be represented within
-argument forms"
(orderings of logical forms), where the question of the validity
of these English arguments are to be decided by the theory.
The manner in which these occurrences are to be represented
formally must therefore be determined by the way in which the
resulting syntax is interpreted by the semantics of the theory.
Every theory of reference being discussed here prescribes some
measure of syntax and semantics, and I shall assume that a
complete and consistent formal language is constructable
,
within which each theory can display its logical forms.
For the reason that analysis of "was a man" is not
germane to his ends, presumably, Russell leaves "was a man"
unanalyzed. But, in another theory of reference, some
occurrences of referring expressions may be analyzed as parts
of complex and indissoluble predicates : "This means viewing
'Tom believes /Cicero denounced CatilineJ' ... as of the
form ' Fa * with a. = Tom and complex 'F'."^
Each theory of reference discussed on these pages
prescribes nonequivalent logical forms of the same English
sentences under analysis. These logical forms are not,
in general, sentences even of the same formal language.
Some, of these logical forms can be reformulated as sentences
of some standard form of lower predicate calculus with
identity (hereafter, "LPC+IT"), to whose basis something
or other may be added. For example, both of the forms
mentioned above—"x was a man" and "Fa"—can be reformulated
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within some standard form of LPC+IT as "Fx"
.
Discussion of these various theories would be facilitated
if we could settle on one formal language within which each
theory could be said to display the logical forms of its
analyses. This is not possible, however, for some theories
prescribe formal languages with quantification over individual
variables only, and others prescribe formal languages with
quantification over other variables as well. Nevertheless,
some form of a language with quantification over individual
variables may be viewed as a part of, if not the whole of,
the primitive basis of each of these languages. In the
paragraph below, I partially construct such a system, which
will be called "L "
. The superscript "1" signifies that
the language is a functional calculus of first order. I shall
represent by "L1 (+...)" a formal language which contains,
possibly, some addition to the basis L1
. Thus, M L
1
(+...)»
is ambiguous among various formal languages, one of which
is L.
L shall be viewed as consisting of the following
primitive symbols: sentence letters: "u". "c"7 '‘ij -*• J • • • y
individual variables: "x", "y», " z ", ...; predicate
symbols: "F", "G", "H"
,
...; a dyadic predicate symbol:
m = i» (read uj_ s identical with"); and any adequate set of
symbols in addition to the above (for example,
»
" v"
,
"E", The language contains some standard set
for formation rules. The language contains the rule of
modus ponens, or MP., and the following theorem schemata:
(-0 = Z. (oc ^ ^)~\ where x and ^ are any individual
variables and Cc and ft are any wffs, and y. and ft differ only in
that in one or more places where Qt has free x,
ft has free £
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(E) Ct D (Ex)/?
,
Where x and £ are any individual
variables and Ot and (3 are any rtfs, and a and 0 differ only
in that in one or more places where Ct has free £ , 0 has fre e x
Sentence letters and predicate s^bols are left uninterpreted.
These may be interpreted by one theory as propositional and
predicate variables, in which case a functional calculus of
second order, having L as its basis, will remove the restrictionm the formation rule of L1 :
If Of is a wff
,
and x is any individual variable, then r (T?x)oPis a wff
to read:
If Or is a wff, and v is any variable, then r (Ev)o? is a wff
In the (unlikely) case of theories prescribing second-order calculi
for which sentence letters and predicate symbols are not variables,
the primitive basis L is augmented to include variables other
than individual variables.
Since "L (+...)" is any formal language having L1 as its
primitive basis, L (+...) may be a functional calculus of
second or higher order. L1 ( + ...) may be extensional or
intensional, depending upon the criterion thereof.
When we speak of a theory's analyzing some English sentence,
analysis will be thought of as consisting, in part, in the
reformulation of that English sentence as some sentence of
L (+...). But the result is not yet a logical form; for a
logical form is not simply a syntactic form, any more than
a definite description is a grammatical form. Logical forms
are j-n
-
terPre ted sentences of a formal language
. The
interpretational element in analysis will be thought of
as consisting in valuation assignments to sentences of L 1 (+...).
The semantics prescribed by a theory of reference will be
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thought of as one which interprets sentences of L 1 (+ ) and
defines validity for T 1 ^. '
' '
' '
Unless indicated to the contrary, reference to a language
L, prescribed by some theory of reference, is reference to
L together with rules for interpreting, and defining
validity within, L (+...)• So conceived, a theory of reference
can decide the question whether certain English arguments are
valid or not.
It is best to think of a theory of reference in this way,
but no effort need be made to construct a formal language,
together with a semantics, for each theory. For the modest
purposes of this study, it is sufficient to assume as
incorporated within each theory of reference a semantics
that validates in L1 (+...), MP, (i), and (e).
$ 5 Logical Forms in Russell’s Theory
Thus, I revise, slightly, Russell's depiction of the
logical form of "Scott was a man" to read "Fx"
.
(Although
it will presumably not be so treated generally, in "On
Denoting," "Scott" is treated as a name.) Now we wish to
know what the logical form of "the author of Naverley was
a man" is. It is not "Fx"
,
according to Russell's statement,
and it must not be if Russell is to solve the following
"puzzle about George IV' s curiosity":
A. Scott = the author of Vaver ley
B. George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author
of Waverley
C. George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott
Now this puzzle is certainly a puzzle that threatens the
validity of II. For C seems at first to follow from A and B,
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given the principle that if * and y are identical, then every
attribute of x is an attribute of y (the attribute in question
being that of being wondered by George 17 whether x as Soott).
But under the Eost natural interpretation of these sentences,
A and B are true, while C is false. But if "the author of
——
;
.
rley" ls a name » then the argument form of A through C
corresponds, in L (+...), to a logical form which is an instance
of (I). Now we may agree that one has failed to show that
21 is not invalid, from an intuitive point of view, if one
admits instances of (l) that are false under some interpretation.
Therefore, since Russell is concerned to defend the validity
of LI» Russell must argue that "the author of Haver lev" is
not a name
.
Russell does have an argument for the proposition that
-the author of Waverley" is not a name. This ar^ment, which
occurs in Princioia Mathematica
,
l0
.oes as follows: Assume
that "the author of Waverley" is a name. Then the sentence
•'Scott = the author of Wayerley " has the logical form "x = y<*.
Then either "Scott = the author of Waverley " is false or,
if true, tautological. But "Scott = the author of Waverley "
is neither false nor tautological. Therefore, "the author
of Waverley is not a name. A modal logician might express
essentially the same intuition hy saying that "Scott = the
author of Waverley" is necessarily true, if true, given that
both referring expressions are standard proper names. In
so asserting, the modal logician appeals to the following
theorem, valid in most modal logics: "x = y D N(x — y)"
(where "N" is an operator which reads "it is necessary that").
Russell purports to prove not only that "the author of
Waverley" is not a name, but that "the author of Waverley "
is an incomplete symbol, a symbol which has no meaning on
its own account. That argument goes as follows: Since
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'•the author of Waver ley" is not a name, then it means nothing;
for if it meant anything it would mean Scott. But the preceding
argument proves that
-the author of jjaverley " cannot mean Scott.
Therefore,
-the author of Waver ley” is an incomplete symbol.
This proof assumes that if a referring expression means
anything on its own account, then it means what is directly
referred to by the expression. But this is a disavowable
assumption and is in fact disavowed within Frege's theory
of reference. Moreover, that a referring expression means
nothing on its own account still does not imply that the
expression is to be analyzed as r (?x)(^x)'1
. Quine's theory
of reference shares the premise that a referring expression
which does not refer in the standard way has no meaning in
isolation, but Quine does not analyze such expressions as
incomplete symbols, symbols of the form r (7x)(0x)"1
.
Some of the premises of Bussell's theory may be questioned,
but these premises differ in an important way from the premise,
crucial to Aristotle's solution—that things are not identical
if they are the same in number accidentally
—in not being
counterintuitive; and we may view as a strong argument in its
favor (if not the strongest argument in its favor) that Russell's
theory offers a satisfactory way of solving puzzles of the
kind under consideration.
Since no definite description is a simple (or we might
say, "complete") symbol, it must not be symbolized by a simple
(or "complete") symbol x. But individual variables are the
only individual symbols in L
1
.
According to Russell's theory, every definite description
is an incomplete symbol, to be defined in the sentential context
in which it occurs and thereupon eliminated. The result of
contextual definition (which goes on at the level of analysis)
is a sentence in primitive notation of L1
,
where the burden of
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reference is put on bound variables of a complex logical form.
One may, if one wishes, symbolize a definite description, or
incomplete symbol of English, by a similarly incomplete symbol
of formal notation. One may introduce into L1 an idiom for
this purpose "7 " with which to form a "description operator"-
(?x)'. Then every definite description is symbolizable by
some expression of the form r (?x)(<£xF, which may be read rthe
£ that is#"’. Let "ll+ ' 7 stani for L1 with the addition of
this new notation, together with definitions for eliminating
(lx) ( <PxJ] from atomic formulas and identity sentences. Thus,
"the author of Waver ley was a man" can now be seen to have the
logical form of "F(7x)Gx" in lVj-. But this last sentence
is definiticnally equivalent to the sentence, in L1
,
"(Ex)((y)(Gy = y = x) . Fx)."
5 6 The Logical Form of Sentences Containing
S tandard Referential Occurrences
Russell ' s "x was a man" served as our prototype of the
logical form of sentences containing standard proper names.
But it serves, a fortiori, as the prototype of the logical
form of sentences containing standard referential occurrences
in Russell's language
. For all and only standard proper names
refer in the standard way in the language. All and only
standard proper names directly designate their objects.
Thus, we can say that, within Russell's language, an expression
a refers in the standard way in a sentence <*, if and only if
the logical form of uc is a sentence of L ( + ...), with some
free individual variable
_x replacing a., wherever a occurs
in (X .
The above bicondition holds for all languages, like Russell's,
in which expressions that refer in the standard way are certain
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kinds of expressions. But we can obtain, for our ends, a
completely general characterization of the logical form
of sentences containing expressions that refer in the
standard way, in terms of occurrences of these referring
expressions. By a "completely general characterization,"
I mean that the bicondition holds for all languages prescribed
by theories of reference discussed on these pages. Let
"a standard referential occurrence" abbreviate "an occurrence
of a referring expression that refers in the standard way."
Then we can say that
(SRO) An occurrence of an expression a in a sentence
Oc is a standard referential occurrence in a
language L, if and only if the logical form of
Of is a sentence of L* ( + ...), with some free
individual variable x replacing that occurrence
of
_a
(SRO) characterizes standard referential occurrence within:
(a) languages in which expressions that refer in the standard
way are any names (see (Def. 1)) that fulfill certain conditions
of occurrence (cl. Frege's notion of ordinary ( gewohnlich )
occurrence and Quine’s notion of purely referential occurrence);
as well as (b) languages in which expressions that refer in
the standard way are special kinds of referring expressions
(namely, standard proper names) (for any occurrence of a
standard proper name is a standard referential occurrence).
!£ke Logical Behavior of Standard Referential Occurrences
We may now turn our attention to the topic, briefly
touched in §3, of the logical behavior that characterizes,
and is a criterion of, standard referential occurrence.
44
This behavior may be defined in terms of the validity of two
inferences
:
Ve can existentially generalize on any expression which
has standard referential occurrence in any sentence of L. That
is, we can validly infer fro. any sentence Of, containing one
or more standard referential occurrences of some expression a,
the sentence r (Sx)^, where § differs from * in containing
an occurrence of a free individual variable x in place of any
standard referential occurrence of a in a. This is confirmed
as follows: By (SHO), the logical form y of of contains free
£ in place of every standard referential occurrence of a in a.
But, by (E)xMP, we can obtain from y the sentence r (Ex) 6n
,
where 6 differs from y in containing free x wherever y containsfree Z . But, as noted (§4), (S) and MP are valid in L.
We can substitute for any expression which has standard
referential occurrence in any sentence of L any other expression
which would have standard referential occurrence in that sentence
and which is related to the first expression by a sign of identity
.
But the substituted expression would have standard referential
occurrence in the original sentence if it has standard referential
occurrence in the identity sentence. That is, if two expressions
a and b have standard referential occurrence in the sentence
r
a = b"1
,
and some sentence Od contains one or more standard
referential occurrences of the expression a, then we can
validly infer from ra = b
"
1 and Od the sentence £, where (3
differs from Oc in containing an occurrence of the expression
—
in place of any standard referential occurrence of a in Oc.
This is confirmed as follows: By (SRO), the logical form
of a_ = b is rx = Z
n
,
and the logical form y of oc contains
free x in place of every standard referential occurrence of
!L in Oc. But, by (i)xMP, we can obtain from rx = yn and y
the sentence 6, where 5 differs from y in containing free z
wherever y contains free x. But, as noted ({4), (i) and MP
are valid in L.
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§8 Nonstandard Referential Occurrence in Russell-s Theory
The characterization (SRO) of the logical form of sentences
containing standard referential occurrences will do for every
theory of reference considered on these pages. What differs,
among these theories, is the logical form of sentences whose
referential occurrences are not standard referential occurrences
By a "nonstandard referential occurrence," it is meant an
occurrence of a referring expression that does not refer in
the standard way. Thus, any occurrence of a nondenoting
referring expression (like
-Pegasus") is a nonstandard referential
occurrence. The more interesting cases, however, are those
involving referring expressions which have unique references
but whose occurrences are nevertheless nonstandard referential
occurrences.
We can generalize on Russell's theory of nonstandard
referential occurrence as follows: If a is any referring
expression which has a unique reference, but is not a standard
proper name, then either a is a definite description, or a is
translatable into a definite description (for example, "Bismarck"
might be translated into "the first chancellor of the German
Empire"). Then a is of the form r(ix)faV, and no expression
of this form directly designates its object; hence, no
expression of this form refers in the standard way. Then
any occurrence of a is a nonstandard referential occurrence.
Then nonstandard referential occurrence within Russell's
language (L^) may be characterized as follows:
(NRO
r )
An occurrence of an expression a in a sentence
(X is a nonstandard referential occurrence in L^,
if and only if the logical form of Oc is a sentence
(3 of L •*•"?" ( + •••)
,
with some incomplete symbol
r (7x) far replacing that occurrence of a
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Note that L +"?» contains no non-truth-functional operators
But puzzles involving nonstandard referential occurrence often
involve modalities (in the broad sense), and formalizations of
these puzzles, in Russell's contemplated lan^age, will require
the introduction into L +")'• of certain non-truth-functional
operators. Thus the necessity of relativizing
(3 , in (NRO ),
to I/V’7" (+...). R
In general, languages under study here are understood
to be languages equipped to represent, formally, an£ nonstandard
referential occurrence in the natural language. I„ some of
these languages, contexts of necessity, belief, and other
modalities give rise to nonstandard referential occurrence.
These languages will therefore be understood to be languages
of mixed modalities, however differently these contexts are
formally represented in the languages.
$ 9 Nonstandard Referential Occurrence in Fre ge ’ s Theory
Much of what has been said here had been anticipated by
Gottlob Frege. In "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung, 1,11 Frege dealt
with puzzles like some of those dealt with by Russell in "On
Denoting" (Russell's theory of descriptions solves other puzzles
besides those under consideration here) and had anticipated the
distinction between standard and nonstandard referential
occurrence. However, in Frege’s theory, every referring
expression which has a unique reference is construed as a '
simple" symbol; that is, not an incomplete symbol, in
Russell's sense. These referring expressions are therefore
names (by (Lef. l)).
But in Frege's theory, also, referring expressions take
more grammatical forms than those listed in {l, and a name
may be a referring expression having some grammatical form
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not listed in §1. For example, “died in misery" and "Kepler
died in misery" are both names, according to the theory.
Interest in this thesis is however restricted to referring
expressions having the grammatical forms listed in §1.
Subsequent reference to names will therefore be understood
to be reference to a subset of names, within Frege's theory.
But if Frege were to analyze every sentence containing
a name a fa "simple" symbol) as a sentence of L 1 (+...) containing
a free individual variable x (a "simple" symbol) in place thereof,
then Frege would encounter the same difficulty we discussed
above in connection with the puzzle about George IV 's curiosity.
But it is an error of analysis, according to Frege's
theory, to represent every occurrence of a name a in every
context by a free individual variable x; for the result
implies no distinction in the values of x in its several
occurrences, and it is precisely diversity of reference of
one and the same name in some of its occurrences that
accounts for nonstandard referential occurrence.
That an occurrence is a nonstandard referential occurrence
is decidable, in Frege's theory, by the "substitutivity
criterion. ' That is, we can tell that a name has a nonstandard
referential occurrence in a context if the name is not
amenable to valid substitution, in accordance with the pattern
of inference described in §7. But Frege explains failures
of substitution by theorizing that the names being substituted
have diverse references. A name refers in the standard way,
because it refers directly to some given object; and in a
nonstandard way, because it refers indirectly to that object
and directly to another object which is related in an interesting
way to the first-mentioned object.
Thus, as we see, whether it refers in the standard way
or in a nonstandard way in some context, a name is "directly
referential," or in David Kaplan's less ambiguous phrase,
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"fully referential it has one reference (and sense) in
its ordinary or direct (grade) occurrence, and another
reference (and sense) in its "oblique" or indirect (ungerade
)
occurrence
.
That a name does in truth shift reference when its
occurrence shifts from substitutive to nonsubstitutive
positions in a sentence can scarcely be sustained by conclusive
argument. But, like Russell's "proof" that "the author of
Waver le^" is an incomplete symbol, Frege's theory (the details
of which I omit) is sustained by premises, none of which are
counterintuitive; and we may view as a strong argument in its
favor (if not the strongest argument in its favor) that
Frege's theory offers a satisfactory way of solving puzzles
of the kind under consideration.
A method of distinguishing, syntactically, nonstandard
from standard referential occurrences may he accomplished by
subscripting individual variables of L1 . Let the variables,
"x", "y", "z", ..., range over objects referred to by names,
whenever these names refer in the standard way; and the
variables, "x
£
', "y
(
" ,
"z
£ ...,
range over objects referred
to by names, whenever these names refer in a nonstandard way.
x
l '»
"
1 " z i"’ •••> shall be thought of as media of indirect
reference to the values of "x", "y", ” z", ..., respectively.
I shall not concern myself with specifying values for
subscripted variables; nor, therefore, with specifying
a relation between the values of "x" and "x
t
"
,
"y" and "y ",
and so on, beyond that of nonidentity
. Objects of reference
in oblique contexts have been variously taken to be individual
concepts, customary senses of referring expressions, and
referring expressions themselves.
The same subscripts may be attached to "p"
,
”q", "r", ...,
"P
"
,
"G”
,
"H**
,
..., resulting in two sets of sentence and
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predicate variables
, corresponding to the contemplated distinction
in the references of sentences and predicates in their standard
and. nonstandard referential occurrences. Let "L^ +
•
t '(+... )»
stand for L1
,
with the addition of this new notation, together
with any primitive symbols, rules of formation, rules of inference,
and axioms, necessary and sufficient to formalize Pregean analyses!
Then nonstandard referential occurrence within a Pregean language
(Lp) may be characterized as follows:
(NROf ) An occurrence of an expression a in a sentence
Gi is a. nonstandard referential occurrence in L^,
if and only if the logical form of OC is a sentence
(3 °f L +"£" (+...), with some free individual
variable x
^
replacing that occurrence of a,
where ft contains, in place of any occurrence of
a in OC, either x or x
^
^
Nonstandard Referential Occurrence in Quine ' s Theory
In his reflections on nonstandard referential occurrence,
Quine follows Frege in construing referring expressions which
have unique references as names. Names are treated provisionally
as expressions open to substitution and existential generalization,
as described in §7. Both Frege and Quine use one or both of these
inferences as a criterion or criteria of nonstandard referential
occurrence. Failure of substitution implies, in Quine's theory
as well as rrege's, that the name being supplanted does not serve,
in the context in which it occurs, to refer directly to its object.
Quine calls nonsubstitutive contexts "opaque" contexts. That
it is an error of analysis to represent occurrences of names within
such contexts by a free individual variable x is held, by both
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Frege and Quine, to be a consequence of the fact that the namedoes not serve, in that context, tc refer to anything; hence,
the value of a variable x. Frege marshals objects other than
things for names to refer to on these occasions. Failure
of substitution therefore implies, in Frege's theory, that
the names being substituted have diverse references; thus
we have not substituted names of identicals
. But Quine
countenances no shifts of reference on these occasions and
concludes that we cannot always substitute names of identicals.
On what appears to be the considered view of Quine, the
logical form of any English sentence « containing a name a
which does not refer in the standard way is a sentence which
contains no individual symbol in place of a. The logical form
that « has will depend upon what Oc says. But there are two
general cases; Sometimes a will be replaced, along with the
balance of its containing phrase (when that phrase is any
context of propositional attitude ; for example, "believes
that ...") by a one-place predicate symbol F. 13 Sometimes
a Will be replaced along with the balance of its containing
sentence (when that sentence is qualified by any alethic
modal ity ;^f or example, "necessarily") by a name of that
sentence. In short, names that do not refer in the
standard way in sentences are analyzed as parts of complex
and indissoluble general terms or names. They are "orthographic
accidents," in Quine's phrase. Sentences of the first variety
are formalizable in L1
; that is, ordinary LPC+IT. The syntactic
interpretation of sentences of the form Necessarily, CC*1 and
rPossibly
,
OC
-1
yields logical forms suitable as formulas within
a syntactic treatment of modalities (as, for example, that
contained in Carnap's Logical Syntax of Lan.-ma^e 1 *^ )
.
However, what is common to the logical forms of all
sentences containing names which do not refer in the standard
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way is the absence, within these forms, of any media of reference
in any expression that replaces those names. Whereas occurrences
of definite descriptions are eliminated in exchange for a string
of quantifiers and variables, occurrences of names in opaque
contexts are absorbed and thus effectively eliminated. The
nonreferential feature of these occurrences is conveyed by the
following characterisation of nonstandard referential occurrence
in Quine's language ( L )
:
Q
(1®0
Q ) An occurrence of an expression a in a sentence
^ a nons ian lard referential occurrence in L
,
if and only if the logical form of 06 is a sentence
^
°f L (+•••) such that, for any expression A
which replaces that occurrence of a, the inference
from (3 to r (Ex)>n is invalid in L^, where y
differs from
ft in containing a free individual
variable
_x in place of A.
In Quine's analogy, A is like "cat" in "cattle."
$ 11 The Way Out
Most of the groundwork having been laid, I now sketch
Russell's, Frege's, and Quine's solutions to the puzzles
threatening the validity of II. If any of these puzzles has
the consequence that is intuitively invalid, then it has
the consequence that it is possible that some individual x
and some individual y are identical, and x has an attribute
which y lacks. The theorist endeavors to disprove this
consequence, indirectly, by arguing, directly, that none of
these puzzles has the consequence that (i) is intuitively
invalid in a language in which these puzzles are clearly
formulated. I now elaborate.
52
Each theory locates the obscurity in the puzzles in
semantical peculiarities of certain occurrences of referring
expressions in their constituent sentences, and each theory
is hound to diagnose this obscurity as a ease of nonstandard
referential occurrence. For suppose one of these theories
assumes that every referring expression refers in the standard
way (has standard referential occurrence) in these sentences.
Then, by (SBO), every referring expression in these sentences
is replaced by a free individual variable in the logical forms
of these sentences. Then logical forms of contingent sentences
will turn out to be either instances of, or negations of instances
of, (I) in L (+...). This results in an inconsistency of
interpretation, for it will be recalled that every theory is
assumed to incorporate a semantics that validates (i) in L1 (+...).
Let me illustrate. Reverting to the Coriscus puzzle
(Chapter II,
^5), suppose the theory assumes that "Coriscus"
and "the approaching man" refer in the standard way everywhere
in (P^-). Then (P-) has a logical form equivalent to the denial
of an instance of (i) in any language suitably equipped to
formulate (P*). For an instance of (i) in L1
,
to which the
operator "K" (read "knows that") is added, is
(1) x = y O (K Fx D K Fy)
z z
But (P*), on the present assumption, has the logical form
(2) x = y . (K Fx . ~K Fy)
z z
m L1 +"K" (+•••), and (2) contradicts (l). Although the semantics
assigns "false" to (2)» (2) is the analysis of a contingent
sentence; hence, a sentence that is possibly true. The theory
therefore fails to prove that the Coriscus puzzle does not have
the consequence that (i) is intuitively valid in L1 +"K" ( + ...)
,
and the theory fails to show that the Coriscus puzzle does not
violate II.
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Similarly, operating with a version of the original
George IV puzzle, it is seen that the argument form of this
puzzle corresponds to the logical form
(3) x = y D (~K
z
(x = y) D -Kjx = x))
in L +"K" (+...), if "Scott" and "the author of Waverley"
are assumed by the theory to refer in the standard way.
But (3) is an instance of (I) in LX +"K" (+...)
. Hence,
the semantics assigns "true" to (3). Yet ( 3 ) is the
analysis of a contingent sentence; hence, a sentence that
is possibly false. Thus, once again the theory fails to
prove that (i) is not intuitively invalid in the language
and thereby fails to prove that the George IV puzzle does
not violate II .
But it is obvious that insofar as (p*) is a contingent
sentence, the context "Aristotle knows that ... is musical"
is one which, on Frege's and Quine's analyses, is not open
to valid substitutions of names within its blanks, in accordance
with the mode of inference described in
§ 7 . The context is
therefore oblique, in Frege's terms; opaque, in Quine's.
Similarly, George IV wished to know whether Scott was ..."
is an oblique/opaque context, in view of the invalidity of
the argument from A to C. Frege's and Quine's solutions
can be seen very quickly.
The logical form of (p*), in Lp, is
(4) x = y • (Kz(Fl x l ) ~Kz(F{ yt )), where "K" is a dyadic
relation, to be read "knows"
which is not the negation of an instance of (i) and of course
does not imply (C ,c ), since ( 4 ) lacks the recurrence of "x" and
"y” within and without the oblique context. (c*) is therefore
a falsidical paradox. Similarly, the logical form, in Lp, of
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the George IV puzzle is
(5) x = y D (~Kz(x, = yt ) D ~Kz(x t = Xf )
)
which is not an instance of (i), and its corresponding
argument form is invalid in the language. The conclusion
C is therefore a falsidical paradox as well.
Since both the Coriscus puzzle and the George IV puzzle
involve contexts of propositional attitude, they are analyzed
by Quine as sentences of ordinary LPC+IT. The logical form
of (P*), in L
,
is
Q
(6) x = y . (Fz . ~Gz
)
which is not the negation of an instance of (i) and of course
doeo not imply (C-*), since (6) lacks the recurrence of ”x" and
y within and without the opaque context. (c*) is therefore
a falsidical paradox. Similarly, the logical form, in L
,
of
the George IV puzzle is ^
(7) x = y D (F Z D Gz)
which is not an instance of (I), and its corresponding argument
form is of course invalid in the language. The conclusion
C is therefore a falsidical paradox as well.
We can generalize: For Frege and Quine there is a simple
formula: if a position in a sentence is nonsubstitutive
,
then
the occurrence of any referring expression in that position is
a nonstandard referential occurrence. Then that occurrence is
diagnosed as an occurrence of an ambiguity (Frege); an orthographic
accident (Quine). Then analysis yields a logical form in which
the occurrence is disambiguated (Frege); eliminated by absorption
(Quine). All puzzles threatening the validity of II can be
shewn, by these methods, to nave falsidical paradoxes as
conclusions
.
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Russell's solution is more complicated than Frege's
and Quine's. As a standard referential occurrence his been
characterized, any occurrence of a definite description is
a nonstandard referential occurrence. But it is not sufficient
to have determined that "the approaching man" and "the author
of Waver ley ," in the Coriscus and George IV puzzles, are
definite descriptions, to have proved their conclusions
falsidical
. In a word, the obscurity in the puzzles is not
removed, once we have diagnosed that obscurity simply as
an occurrence of an ambiguity (as in Frege's case) or a
sentence fragment (as in Quine's case). Russell's
definite description, or incomplete symbol, is a sentence
fragment, but one whose occurrence still requires, sometimes,
a kind of disambiguation before we have the completed
logical form. In particular, disambiguation of what is
called "scope" of the description is necessary, whenever
a definite description occurs within the scope of any
sentence operator, truth-functional or otherwise. But every
puzzle threatening the validity of II contains a non-truth-
functional operator, on Russellian analysis.
To illustrate scope ambiguity, take the sentence
(8) It is false that the present queen of Denmark is bald
We may avoid theoretical difficulties about whether "the
present queen of Denmark" is a name or description by simply
regarding all referring expressions, other than pronouns,
as definite descriptions (hidden or unhidden). Then "the
present queen of Denmark" is replaced, on analysis, by an
incomplete symbol "(?x)Fx". Eut we cannot formulate the
proposition expressed by (8), for there are at least two
propositions expressed by (8); namely, those expressed by
(9) It is false that there is exactly one queen of Denmark
and she is bald
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and
(10) There Is exactly one queen of Denmark and she is not bald
If contextual definition of ( 8 ) results in an existential
sentence (of. ( 10 )), then the description, "the present queen
of Denmark," is said to have primary occurrence
, or the larger
12221. in ( 8 ); otherwise (of. (9)), it is said to have secondary
occurrence
,
or the smaller scope
,
in ( 3 ). ( 9 ) and ( 10 ) can
be formulated, in the fashion of Principia Hathematica
. *14,
by
(9')
~/T?x)(Fx]7g( 7x)(Fx)
and
(10') /C?x)(Fx}7~G(?x)(Fx)
respectively, where "/T?x) (FxJ7" is the scope operator
. ( 9 .)
and ( 10 ') are, by definition, equivalent to
(9”) ~(Ex)((y)(Fy s y = x) • Gx)
and
(10") (Ex)((y)(Fy = y = x) . ~Gx)
respectively.
Now in the case of the George IV puzzle, where "Scott"
is construed as a name, the difference in the scope of "the
author of Waver ley " makes the difference between a valid and
an invalid argument. If its scope is the larger scope, then
the position in which "the author of Waverley " occurs in B
i® substitutive
; for, where "£" represents any function:
r
z= (i*)(&l) 3 (LWz)) s Zr>x)(#xj7f.Wji)(#i)))‘1
is a theorem of L +" 7" (+...). But we have assumed that every
theorem of L^+"7" (+...) is valid. In particular, therefore,
where "the author of Waverley" has the larger scope in B,
57
A through C will be formulated as
A y = (?x)(Fx)
B /[)x)(Fz]y~K (y = (»x)(Fx))
0 ~K
z
(y = y)
which is a valid argument in I^. 16 However, this argument is
not the George IV puzzle. For the puzzle U engendered by the
(normal) interpretation of the position of "the author of Waverley"
in B as nonsubstitutive. Hence, insofar as the argument from
A to C is a puzzle, the scope of the description in B is the
smaller scope.
Here, then, we have a method of obtaining the argument
forms of all puzzles threatening the validity of n. Having
determined which occurrences of referring expressions are
nonstandard referential occurrences (that is, occurrences of
definite descriptions), we then use Frege's and Quine's
subst ltut lvity criterion to determine, not nonstandard referential
occurrence, but scope of description.
Supposing "Coriscus" to be a name, the logical form of
(
H
’*) > in Lg, is therefore
(U) y (?x)(Px) • (K
z
(Oy) •
~K
z
/r>x)(FxJ7G(;x)(Fx))
which is not the negation of an instance of (i) and does
not imply (C*). (C*) is therefore a falsidical paradox.
Where, on the other hand, "(?x)(Fx)" has the larger scope
in (P*), the implication to (C*) is valid in 1^, but (p*)
is logically false in 1^. Similarly, the logical form of
the George IV puzzle, in L^, is
(12) y = ( 7x) (Fx) 3 (^
z
/Cjx)(Fx)J(y = (?x)(Fx)) 3 ~K (y = y))
which is not an instance of (i), and its corresponding argument
form is invalid in the language
. The conclusion C is therefore
a falsidical paradox as well. Again, if "(7x)(Fx)" has the
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larger scope in B, then, as we have seen, the argument is
valid in L
R ,
hut intuitively unobjectionable
.
Leonard Linsky evidently takes issue with my last
statement. Linsky seems to think a reading of B, where
"the author of Waver ley" has the larger scope (-the primary
interpretation"
) is "wrong". In fact, he gives an argument
for its being wrong:
I ".
ls *ronS> for on ^i S interpretation entailsthat Layerley was not oo-authored. If Waverley had been
co-authored it would not, on the primap—interpretation,be logroaily possible that George IV wished to' know whetherScott was the author of Uaverley
. But no plausible analysis
of our proposition (hereafter 1'B.g) can have this consequence.VU"\Clent 00ndlt10'1 for the truth of /\J i s that George IVshouid have asked, in all seriousness, 'Is Scott the author
of Waverley?' Now surely he could have seriously askedthis question though Waver ley had been co-authored .7
This argument cannot prove that there is no true primary
interpretation of B. For, that George IV should have asked,
in all seriousness, "Is Scott the author of Waver ley ?" can
only be a sufficient condition for the truth of B if there is
no true primary interpretation of B; and this Linsky has not
shown.
* 12 Toward Formalization
The moral of this part of our story is that what Carnap
called "the antinomy of the name relation"
_is an antinomy,
only if every referential occurrence is a standard referential
occurrence. That every referential occurrence is a standard
referential occurrence is tantamount to the proposition that
every referential occurrence is an occurrence of a standard
proper name. But as we have just seen, each solution consists
in analyzing some referential occurrences as occurrences of
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(1) ambiguous names (Prege ) , ( 2 ) incomplete symbols (Russell),
or (3) orthographic accidents (Quine).
The three theories of nonstandard referential occurrence,
whose solutions we have just reviewed, were selected for study
because of the influence each has had on contemporary attempts
to formalize some of the languages which generate puzzles of the
kind in question. Although all of these theories have the
consequence that these puzzles do not have antinomies for
conclusions, some of these theories have the consequence that
we cannot "quantify into" these languages. According to the
theory that nonstandard referential occurrences are orthographic
accidents, the logical forms of sentences containing these
occurrences contain no individual symbols (variables or constants)
in any expressions that replace these occurrences. These
occurrences are buried, on analysis, within predicates and
names (of sentences). But, given the ordinary interpretation
of quantifiers, you cannot quantify into predicates or names.
Doubtless, if a sentence containing a nonstandard referential
occurrence has the logical form just depicted, then it is
impossible to quantify into these languages, given the ordinary
interpretation of quantifiers. But why should we acquiesce in
the conclusion that this is_ the logical form of sentences
containing nonstandard referential occurrences?
There are a number of ways of avoiding this conclusion.
One way is Russell's, and still another is Frege's. Frege's
theory does not give us quite what we want, however, if by
"quantifying in" we mean the following: we are able to derive
quantified sentences, with "it is necessary that," "believes
that," and like modal expressions, applied to matrices whose
variables are bound by the initial quantifiers, where these
quantifiers are read, "There is something x such that" or
"Each thing x is such that." Such formalizations are, of course,
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impossible
,
within Frege's theory. Nevertheless, It may be
possible to formulate and derive, using essentially Fregean
methods, sentences which have the same English readings as
sentences which are obtained by quantifying in, as characterised
above. That is, the absence of a proposal within Frege's
discussion for formulating and deriving sentences like
"There is something which is necessarily greater than five"
and "There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy" does
not foreclose the possibility of formulating and deriving
such sentences in a way compatible with Frege’s doctrine,
and we shall encounter one such proposal in Chapter V.
But if I am not mistaken, we can adhere to an interpretation
of nonstandard referential occurrences as opaque occurrences
(occurrences within opaque contexts) and still avoid the
conclusion that we cannot quantify into opaque contexts,
given the ordinary interpretation of quantifiers. What I
must prove, then, is that to be an opaque occurrence is not
to be an orthographic accident. What I must prove is that
there is still some hope for opaquely occurring referring
expressions. They need not he locked up forever inside
indissoluble complex names and general terms.
To that end I present arguments to the contrary. The
arguments are those of W. V. Quine, author of the theory that
nonstandard referential occurrences are orthographic accidents
and the most influential critic of first-order formalizations
of modal languages. Modal languages, in the broad sense,
include, prominently, languages of necessity and possibility
and languages of propositional attitude
. These, among
languages exhibiting nonstandard referential occurrence,
have received the most thorough logical study, and it is
to these languages that subsequent discussion is restricted.
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Fy = y
= u = w)
= w
* w = y Assumption (1)
6 w = y
7 y = w
8 Fy
9
10
(u ) (Fu
Fy 5 y
= u = v)
= V
•
~k
z
(v = y) Assumption (2)
ll y = v
12 V = y
13 ~K (v = y)
14 y)
Note that 14 follows from 12 and 13 by (i) and MP in L^+"?
17
Linsky, on. cit
.
,
p. 69 .
1S T+It would apnear that Linsky* s line of reasoning shouldlead him to conclude that any number of de_ re interpretations
of propositional-attitude constructions are wrong, and it would
appear that the imagined wrongness of these interpretations
is not due to any peculiarities of definite descriptions.
Suppose "the Eternal City" is a name. Suppose further that
someone, call him "Tom", is unaware that "the Eternal City"
names Rome, about whose existence Tom has no doubts, and
that
(1) Tom wishes to know whether the Eternal City exists
Following a distinction of Quine's, in "Quantifiers and
Propositional Attitudes," we suppose that "wishes to know"
has its relational," as against its "notional," sense in (l^.
Call this interpretation of (l) "the relational interpretation."
So interpreted, (l) implies, in L,
:
(2) (Ex) (Tom wishes to know whether (Ey)(y = x))
Compare Linsky' s argument with the following argument that
there is no true relational interpretation of (l); that is,
that the relational interpretation of ( 1 ) is wrong:
It is wrong, for (l) on this interpretation entails that
the Eternal City exists. If the Eternal City did not
exist it would not, on the relational interpretation,
be logically possible that Tom wishes to know whether
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City exists * But no plausible analysis
ot can have this consequence. A sufficient
condition for the truth of (l) is that Torn shouldhave asked, m all seriousness, 'Does the EternalCity exist?' Wow surely he could have asked thisquestion though the Eternal City had not existed
Again, the argument simply assumes what it purports to prove.One detects in Linsky's argument the ingredients of an argument
.
s® COndary ( cf * notional) interpretations of propositional-
attitude constructions do not (in the absence of supportingpremises) imjply primary (cf. relational) interpretations ofthese constructions. This is, however, not what Linsky says.
CHAPTER FOUR
PROBLEMS FOR FORMALIZATION:
A STUDY OF QUINE'S ARGUMENTS
$1 Introduction
In all of Quine's discussions of the problems of
interpreting languages of necessity and possibility and
languages of propositional attitude, to which quantifiers
have been added, the point of departure is the problem of
making sense of quantified sentences with "it is necessary
that," "believes that," and the like, applied to matrices
whose variables are bound by the initial quantifiers. But
the more interesting problem, still, is one of making sense
of such quantified sentences, when the quantifiers "(Ex)"
and "(x)" are read "There is something x such that" and
"Each thing x is such that."
Quine once proposed a way of making sense of sentences
like
(1) (Ex)N(x is identical with the morning star),
where "N" corresponds to the words, "it is necessary that;"
but it would be premature to suppose that (l) can be read as
(2) There is something which is necessarily identical with
the morning star.
The proposal, contained in "The Problem of Interpreting Modal
Logic," was presented in the form of the following "criterion":
(ii) An existential quantification holds if there is a
constant whose substitution for the variable of quantification
would render the matrix true.-*-
Presumably, the result of replacing the variable by a constant
renders the matrix true, if and only if the result is analytic:
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(i) The result of prefixing to any statement is
true if and only if the statement is analytic.
^
Quine proceeded to argue that (ii) has "queer ontological
consequences." By this Quine meant that if the contemplated
version of quantified modal^ logic (hereafter "QML" ) can be
interpreted in a consistent way, then its variables do not
range over material objects. Consequently, (l) cannot be
read as (2), since "x" does not have for its value the
material object, or thing, the morning star.
But (ii) cannot have, all by itself, queer ontological
consequences. The conjunction of (ii) with other premises,
which specify properties of the contemplated language, may,
however, have such consequences. It is evident, from the
discussion, what relevant properties the language possesses.
Its basis consists of all quantification laws (including all
tru th—funct ional laws); formation rules are those of quantification
theory augmented only by the addition to its basis of the modal
operators, "M" and "N" (read, respectively, "it is possible
that" and "it is necessary that"); and a "constant" is
interpreted as any referring expression which has a unique
reference. Constants are the formal counterparts of names,
as defined in Chapter III, § 3» and we have already observed
(Chapter III, 10) that Quine construes referring expressions
which have unique references as names.
As we shall see, in this and the following chapter, there
are a number of ways of avoiding queer ontological consequences
in a system of QML. That is, there are a number of ways of
doing QML which do not involve the repudiation of material objects
from one's universe of discourse. There are, to put the point
in still another and more fruitful way, systems of QML which
give truth conditions for existential quantifications in these
languages, where the quantifier "(Ex)" is read "There is something
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X such that,- and the variable of quantification occurs
inside the scope of any modal operator. And it may be
added that there are systems of epistemic and doxastic
logic which give truth conditions for existential quantifications
in these languages, where the quantifier "(Ex)" reads
"There is something x such that," and the variable of
quantification occurs inside the scope of any epistemic
or doxastic operator.
If these truth conditions are semantically sustainable,
then some of Quine's objections to quantifying into languages
of necessity and possibility and languages of propositional
attitude have been met. To have met these objections does
not imply that Quine has no basis for denying the legitimacy
of these formal enterprises. The objections that concern
us are those which hold that deductions by some form of
existential generalisation are intuitively invalid. There
can be no doubt that the deductions which Quine contemplates
are intuitively invalid. There is no need, however, to acquiesce
in the conclusion that the deductions contemplated by Quine
are forced upon the logician bent upon quantifying into
languages of necessity and possibility and languages of
propositional attitude. On the other hand, it seems certain
that any version of QML is committed to some version of
Aristotelian essentialism : the doctrine that some attributes
are essential to some objects; and even with regard to
those objects about which Quine feels perhaps the least
reluctance to admit essential attributes—numbers—the
expressed view has been that "to be necessarily greater
than 7 is not a trait of a number;"^ that necessity, if
it is to be understood at all, attaches to statements.
This is surely a view which, in A. F. Smullyan's phrase,
"impedes the progress of modal logic. "5 But if one is
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willing (for whatever reason) to countenance the contrary view—
that numbers, and perhaps other things as well, have essential
attributes—then one may construe the sentence, "nine is necessarily
greater than five," as expressing an attribute of nine; in which
case the inference to "There is something which is necessarily
greater than five" seems intuitively valid.
In succeeding pages we shall encounter various versions
of QML, alternative to Quine’s contemplated version, which
give truth conditions for sentences like (2). These alternative
versions of QML range from the most conservative, which involves
no interference with any of the logical laws assumed in Quine's
discussion, but offers a different account of "constant" (and
in some cases, though it is not necessary, an addition to the
notation of the operator "Ox)"); to the most radical, which
involves restricting one of the most fundamental of quantification
laws. An intermediate, but still essentially left-wing, version
of QML involves restricting a less fundamental quantification
law. Of these alternative versions of QML, I shall argue
(in Chapter V), the most radical fails to give semantically
sustainable truth conditions for its quantified sentences.
In some respects, this version of QML—"contingent identity"
systems, by name— is reminiscent of Aristotle's way out of
the Sophists' puzzle: not merely because, I venture to say,
both fail; but, more specifically, because both betray a
less than firm grasp of the concept of identity.
But let us now consider Quine's challenge—for that is
what it is—to the possibility of giving semantically sustainable
truth conditions for existential quantifications of the kind
described above. Two versions of this challenge will be
presented. In one, Quine proves that interpreting the syntax
of a given system of QML yields a contradiction. In another,
Quine proves that "(Ex)NFx" is meaningless in a given system
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of QML (the same system as before). Both arguments are easily
modified to prove the semantical inconsistency and meaninglessness,
respectively, of given systems of quantified epistemic logic and
quantified doxastic logic.
§ 2 Quine's Challenge : Version 1
We do a proof in the hypothesized system of "The Problem
of Interpreting Modal Logic," assuming that variables range
over material objects:
1 Morning star = evening star • N(morning star = morning star)
2 (El)(i - evening star • N(x = morning star))
3 Evening star — evening star • ~N(evening star = morning star)
4 (Ex ) (x = evening star • ~N(x = morning star))
5 (Ex)(Ey)(x = y • (N(x - morning star) • ~Il(y = morning star))
6 (x) (y ) (x = y D (N(x = morning star) D N(y = morning star))
The contradiction is avoided if we take as the values of the
variables of the system something other than material objects.
Individual concepts are suggested by Quine. In this event,
1 is false, since the individual concept, the morning star,
is not identical with the individual concept, the evening star.
The relation between the aforementioned concepts is called
"congruence" (in symbols, "C"). We no longer derive 5, but
only
5' (Ex) (Ey) (x C y • (N(x C morning star) . ~N(y C morning star))
which is not at all paradoxical, since the individual concepts,
the morning star and the evening star (and, for that matter,
Venus) are diverse entities.
In this version of Quine's challenge, the following rule
of existential generalization:
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(BG0 ) Prom a, infer
r (Ex)0^, where x is any individual
variable, a_ is any individual constant, and OC and (3 are
any wff s
,
and OC and [3 differ only in that in one or more
places where OC contains contains free x
is assumed to hold (see criterion (ii)) for the purpose of
giving truth conditions for sentences like (l) (see above,
page 64 ). This assumption is not necessarily one for
reductio ad absurdum, for we may be able to disavow some
other assumption (as, for example, that a constant is any
referring expression which has a unique reference). But
Quine has definite reasons for adhering to the other assumptions
which he makes about his contemplated version of QML. In
particular, concerning his reasons for assuming that a
constant is any referring expression which has a unique
reference, the following may be said:
In "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic," as
throughout Quine's discussions, the theme is that necessity
is to be explained by analyticity; hence criterion (i) and
the not-independent criterion (ii). The thesis, in brief,
is the following: the truth value of every sentence
containing "N" is to be explained, either directly or
indirectly, in terms of a sentence prefixed by "N"
,
where
"the result of prefixing fjIS'J to any statement is true
if and only if the statement is analytic" (criterion (i)).
Now in a language which contains no individual symbols
save variables, sentences of the forms r (Ex)Mo l and '"(Ex^Ntt 1
,
where OC contains free x, are intelligible, on Quine's
lights, only if these sentences are transformable into
sentences of the forms ^(ExJqT1 and rN(Ex)cf; "but,"
says Quine, "unfortunately matrices are not generally
thus transformable." In view of the failure of the
aforementioned conversions, names seem the natural choice
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for specifying the values of variables in modal contexts.
Moreover, in the absence of a theory to distinguish standard
proper names from other names (cf. Kaplan’s treatment (Chapter
v
> §9)), a name is any referring expression which has a unique
reference
•
In his review of "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic,"
A. F. Smullyan states that if a constant is a "singular
descriptive phrase," then
we would find that the principle of existential generalization
would be invalid ... This may be shown by example. It is
certain that
-(The author of Waver ley was a non-author'),for the scope of the description here is ’The author of
Waver ley was a non-author.’ But it would just as certainly
be an egregious error to infer from this truth the following:
(3x) (L_I ~( x was a non-author)). For this last statement
implies that it is logically necessary that there are
authors, a proposition that is more comforting than true.^
But this is just more grist for Quine’s mill. Quine is quite
convinced that existential generalization is invalid in his
system of QML, as long as material objects are the values of
its variables, and requires for that assurance no appeal to
the theorem I_ (E_x)'N'a N^ExJgT1 . At the conclusion of "The
Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic," Quine says that the
modal logician may "disavow the criterion (ii) which underlies
my argument. But then we have yet to see what might plausibly
be put forward in its stead.
£ 3 Quine * s Challenge : Version _2
Quine’s challenge to the semantical sustainability of
QML more often takes the form of an argument for the conclusion
that sentences of the forms r (Ex)M0? and r (Ex)NC?, where OC contains
free x.> are meaningless; although what Quine proves is that
these sentences are meaningless in his contemplated version of QML.
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But the system is now described in the terms of his earlier
paper, "Notes on Existence and Necessity."^ The language is
"referent lally opaque," and names in the language do not occur
"purely referent ially" in the language.
The alleged meaninglessness of sentences of the form 3
(Ex)MQt and (Ex)NoT1
,
where Oc contains free x, is now
characterized as the meaninglessness of quantifications
(generalizations) into opaque contexts. And sometimes
Quine is led to the dogmatic conclusion, "You cannot quantify
into an opaque construction," 10 disregarding, it seems, the
possibility indicated at the conclusion of "The Problem of
Interpreting Modal Logic" (see $ 2)
.
In order to evaluate the present criticism, we should
become as clear as possible about the terms in which it is
formulated. The following definitions are closest in
formulation to the account given in Vord and Object
,
page 144:
(Def. 3) A context <£( ) is referent ially transparent
,
if and only if, for any name a and any name
or sentence 'iT'(ja), if a is purely referential
in ^(ci)
,
then a. is also purely referential in
the containing name or sentence ^(^(a))
(Def. 4 ) A context £() is referent ially opaque
,
if and
only if there is a name a and a name or sentence
Ka) such that a is purely referential in'lf'(a),
and a is not purely referential in the containing
name or sentence a))
As Definitions 3 and 4 imply,
(Cons.) A context ^>( ) is either referentially transparent
or referentially opaque and not both
Quine's account of "purely referential occurrence" is given
72
as follows:
I call an occurrence of a singular term /name? in
a statement purely referential (Frege
:
geradeT, if.
roughly speaking, the term serves in that particular
context simply to refer to its object.
H
The interdef inable terras, "referential transparency"
and "purely referential occurrence," are often defined,
by philosophers, in terms of the validity of the rule
(SIq), below, as follows:
(Def. 5) A sentence OC is a referent ially transparent
context Jot : a name a occurs purely
referentially in a sentence OcJ
,
if and only
if the following is a valid inference
:
(SI0 ) From
r
a = bn and Qc, infer j3, where a and
b^ are any names and OC and {3 are any sentences, and Oc
and (3 differ only in that in one or more places where
Oc contains a_, j3 contains b_
(Definitions 3 through 5 do not require relativization to
a language. Which referring expressions are to count as
names in a language is of course a variable. But determination
of namehood is presupposed in the definitions.)
Quine does not appear to hold any stronger claim than
that the validity of (SIQ ) is a necessary condition of
referential transparency (purely referential occurrence).
However, where this and all other indicated conditions of
referential transparency are satisfied by a language (for example,
names serve in their contexts simply to refer to their objects),
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there is some justification in calling these languages
referentially transparent (the occurrences of the names
in the language purely referential).
To prove that the language of Quine's contemplated
version of QML is referentially opaque, it suffices to
prove that the context »N()» is referentially opaque. To
prove that "N()" is referentially opaque, it suffices to
prove that (SIQ ) is invalid in the language. The following
illustrates the invalidity:
1 N(morning star = morning star)
2 Evening star = morning star
3 ^(evening star = morning star)
Quine will argue that the referential opacity of the
language is exhibited also in the following proof:
1' N(nine is greater than five)
2' (Ex)N(x is greater than five)
But what does not wear itself on its forehead is the nontruth
of "(Ex)N(x is greater than five)." It may he held that 2'
is not true because it asserts that something has the trait
of being necessarily greater than five, and being necessarily
greater than jL ive is not £ trait of £ number . And since 1'
i£ true, then 1* does not assert that nine has the trait of
being necessarily greater than five.
This line of argument may serve to prove invalidity,
but it does not serve to prove referential opacity
. For we
cannot simply conclude that if the blanks in r . .
.
£ ...“>
do not express a trait of the bearer of a, then a occurs
opaquely (that is, not purely referentially) therein. For
substitut ivity (SI^) is still a reliable criterion of opacity;
yet
-(£ exemplifies £)"* is not referentially opaque by this
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criterion, in spite of the fact that r~(a exemplifies a)"1
does not express a trait of the hearer of a. 12 Moreovlr,
the present line of argument rests its case for the nontruth
of 2* on the premise that essentialism is a nontrue doctrine;
and this line of argument will not serve at all to prove
that (EG
0
) is even invalid—much less a criterion of opacity-
in languages of propositional attitude.
What is needed is an argument for the nontruth of 2'
which at the same time proves 1' referentially opaque. There
is such an argument, and that argument happily can be used to
prove opacity in languages of propositional attitude as well.
More happily, still, that argument also serves to prove the
meaninglessness of quantifications into opaque contexts,
which is what Quine is ultimately concerned to prove.
The argument in question rests its case for the nontruth
of 2' on the meaning of a meaningful open sentence
. Specifically,
(0) Every meaningful open sentence <£x is referentially
transparent
where
(Def. 6) An open sentence £>x is referentially transparent,
if and only if, for all names a^ and b, if ra = b -1
and 5^a_ are true, then <£>b is true
For the sake
(Def. 7)
(Def. 8)
of completeness, I include the following trivialities:
If P(E2
.)
<£x~i is a meaningful existential quantification,
then ^x is a meaningful open sentence
If OC is true, then oc is meaningful
Now it is a simple matter to prove that 2' is not true,
given the above principle and definitions; since 2' is meaningless,
by the above principle and definitions. Furthermore, we are able
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to prove that 1* is referentially opaque, given (Cons.).
1 "(Ex)N(x is greater than five)" is a true
existential quantification
2 " (Ex)N(x is greater than five)" is a
meaningful existential quantification
3 "N(x is greater than five)" is a meaningful
open sentence
4 "N(x is greater than five)" is referentially
transparent
5 "The number of planets = nine" is true
6 "N(nine is greater than five)" is true
7 "N(the number of planets is greater than
five)" is true
8 It is false that 7
9 "N(x is greater than five)" is not
referentially transparent
10 "N(x is greater than five)" is not a
meaningful open sentence
11 "(Ex)N(x is greater than five)" is not a
meaningful existential quantification
12 "(Ex)N'(x is greater than five)" is not true
Assumption
for reductio
(Def. 8)
(Def. 7)
( 0 )
Premise
Premise
(Def. 6)
Premise
(Def. 6) and
truth-functions
(0) and
truth-functions
(Def. 7) and
truth-functions
(Def. 8) and
truth-functions
The preceding argument proves the invalidity of the inference
from 1' to 2’ (6, 12) and hence the invalidity of (EGQ ) in the
language
; the referential opacity of 1« (but really by (SIQ ),
as we see (5, 6, 7, 8)); and the meaninglessness of this instance
of quantification into an opaque context (11). But it is obvious
that we can generalize to prove the meaninglessness of every
instance of quantification into an opaque context:
1 is any opaque context
2 It is not true that, for all names a. and b,
if ra_ = b”1 and $
a_
are true, then <£>b is
true
3 <Px is not a meaningful open sentence
4 r(Ex)£x
-
' is not a meaningful existential
quantification
Assumption
(Cons
. )
,
(Def. 5)j and
truth-functions
(0), (Def. 6), and
truth-functions
(Def. 7) and
truth-functions
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V 4 Conclusions
Has Quine proved his case? It all depends on what you
take his case to be. Suppose you take it to be the conclusion
that
(C.l) You cannot give semantically sustainable truth conditions
for existential quantifications in languages of necessity
and possibility and languages of propositional attitude,
where the quantifier "(Ex)" reads "There is something
x such that," and the variable of quantification occurs
inside the scope of any modal, epistemic, or doxastic
operator
.
Then if Quine has proved his conclusion, that conclusion is
sustained by the argument of { 2 or the argument of §3 or both.
Both of these arguments depend for their soundness on
the proposition that all languages of necessity and possibility
and all languages of propositional attitude are referentially
opaque. Both arguments also presuppose the truth of principle
(0). But it is possible to subscribe to (0) while denying
the first-mentioned proposition, as we shall now see.
The intuitive justification given for (0) has been that
11 HL 0£g.n sentence expresses a genuine condition on an object
,
*hen that °Pen sentence is true or false of that object
,
no
matter 1°2L Hi object i_s specified . 13 The question whether
this italicized sentence expresses a proposition sufficient
to justify (0) we may, for the present, put aside. It does
not, by itself, express a proposition sufficient to justify
a less subtle assumption in Quine's argument. For the
soundness of his argument requires that "specification"
consists in replacing the free variable in an open sentence
by a name . But clearly one need not specify an object in
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this way. Definite descriptions specify objects. Suppose
the author of Waverley satisfies some open sentence symbolized
*y "Fx" in V Then ’ in V M (Bx )((y)(Ay * y « X) . Px)« is
a way of specifying an object that satisfies the open sentence
"Fx". If all names refer in the standard way in some modal
language—that is, if all names in the language are standard
proper names—and every object is specified, in the language,
by definite description or standard proper name, then one does
not get, in this language, the intuitively invalid derivations
that one does get in Quine's hypothesized modal language.
But it is on the basis of these invalid derivations in a
language that the language is defined ((Def. 5)) as referentially
opaque; and it is on the basis of these derivations that Quine
has sometimes purported to prove the inconsistency (§?) and
meaninglessness (§3) of quantified modal logic.
Furthermore, if every name in some modal language is
a standard proper name, then, since the language is not
referentially opaque, Quine's criterion (ii) (}l) is adequate
as a truth condition for existential quantifications in at
least one language of necessity and possibility. That is,
(iii) An existential quantification holds in L if
rl
there is a constant whose substitution for the variable
of quantification would render the matrix true.
But we can conjoin to (iii) the following truth condition:
(iv) An existential quantification holds in if
there is a definite description whose substitution for
the variable of quantification would render the matrix
true, if the description had the largest possible scope
in the matrix.
Substitution instances of the sort described in (iv) are true,
according to many modal logicians, when the matrix (open sentence)
78
is of the form rWfe-\ and the predioate of the matrix u neoessary
and, furthermore, some predicates are necessary. This lately
expressed view seems to be repugnant to Quine. Or perhaps it
is just the view that some nonlogical predicates are necessary
to some objects which is repugnant to Quine. His objections
have not, I think, been made very clear. At any rate, Quine
has no conclusive argument that the notion of necessary and
contingent attribution is incoherent.
Quine has sometimes produced an alternative challenge to
the meaningfulness of sentences of the form p(Ex)M4P and p (Ex)Efc\
where Oc contains free x, assuming a system of QML in which
material objects are specified by descriptive phrases rather
than names. The system contains the axiom "N(p g> q) D ( Np DNq)."
But now let us ban singular terms other than variables.
We can still specify things; instead of specifying themby designation we specify them by conditions that uniquelydetermine them. On this approach we can still challenge
the coherence of ( 4 ) /(3x) necessarily x is odd7, by askingthat such an object be specified. One answer is that
(5) (3£)(£ = i = Z£=£ + £ + j£).
But that same number x is uniquely determined also by
this different condition: there are x planets. Yet ( 5 )entails 'x is odd* and thus evidently sustains ’necessarily
x is odd’, while 'there are x planets' does not. 1 4
Now it must be admitted that this argument moves in mysterious
ways. In particular, the move from the statement about
entailments and nonentailments to the conclusion, that
"(3x) necessarily x is odd" is of doubtful coherence, is
mysterious. The coherence of an open sentence has been
defined by referential transparency; but if we are working
within a system in which the only individual symbols are
variables, then ( 0 ) cannot be appealed to to sustain that
conclusion. Moreover, extending the notion of referential
transparency to apply to variables is of no avail; for it is
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certain that whatever principle of meaningfulness of open
sentences is assumed by Quine, that principle is not Quine's
standard one involving the notion of identity
. The question,
"What is this thing which is necessarily odd? The thing
which is necessarily identical with the sum of its three
square roots? That is, the thing which contingently numbers
the planets?" is easily answered in the affirmative. It is
easily answered in the affirmative, that is, unless one objects
to essentialism. Some have taken Quine's alternative challenge
to be a challenge of the coherence of necessary and contingent
attribution, and perhaps that is all it is. (i say "all", for
I have already inlicated that Quine has no conclusive argument
that the notion of necessary and contingent attribution is
incoherent.) In any event, the basis for the conclusion that
"(3x) necessarily x is odd" is of doubtful coherence, on the
present line of reasoning, is not transparent.
I have been arguing that neither version of Quine's
challenge sustains (C.l). This is so because you can have
a modal language which is not referentially opaque, as we
have seen, by simply adopting Russell's theory of descriptions
with its method of contextual definition.
Formally speaking, the disavowable implicit assumption
of both of Quine's arguments is that a constant is any referring
expression which has a unique reference. Quine frequently
makes a similar assumption about languages of propositional
attitude, and this assumption is equally disavowable; for a
Russellian approach to languages of propositional attitude is
equally feasible, and criteria (iii) and (iv) hold for such
languages
.
But just as a Russellian treatment offers us one method
of specifying objects which enables us to give semantically
sustainable truth conditions for quantifications in languages
8o
of necessity and possibility, so there may be others. Suppose
there are others and moreover that among these at least one
interprets some open sentence <£x as referentially opaque. Then
(0) is false. For an open sentence $x must express a genuine
condition on (be true or false of) an object, if there are
semantically sustainable truth conditions for r (Ex)<£x_l .
What matters, I have been trying to say, for a reconciliation
of the mixture of quantifiers and modalities with the intuitive
grounds of Quine's objections to the mixture, is that we are
able to give semantically sustainable truth conditions for
quantifications in modal languages, however we go about it.
I have argued that if you take Quine's case to be (C.l),
then Quine has not proved his case. But suppose you take it
to be, not (C.l), but the conclusion that
(C.2) You cannot give semantically sustainable truth conditions
for existential quantifications in referentially opaoue
languages.
In short, "you cannot quantify into opaque contexts." Then
whether Quine has proved his case or not still depends on
what is meant by "quantifying into opaque contexts." When
Quine says that you cannot quantify into opaque contexts,
he means that you cannot validly existentially generalize, in
accordance with the rule (EGq), if (l) a occurs opaquely in
Of, and (2) r (Ex)pn is interpreted in its customary way, by
which he means, ft satisfies (0). Given these supporting lemmas,
the inadmissibility of quantifying into opaque contexts is
undeniable. Those who argue that quantification into opaque
contexts is possible clearly mean something different by the
phrase "quantifying into opaque contexts." But a more general
conception of the phrase seems in order. Imagine a system
that is in every respect like those hypothesized by Quine,
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save for containing (EGq) as a rule. In its stead there is
some other rule which provides for existentially generalizing
on opaquely occurring names. Clearly, we want to say of this
imagined system that opaque contexts are quantified into. Nor
should Quine object peremptorily. Recall his closing words
in "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic."
In the following chapter I examine some approaches to
quantifying into opaque contexts. Some of these, I shall
try to show, are reconcilable with the intuitive grounds of
Quine's objections to quantifying into opaque contexts.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXPLICATIONS OF REFERENT IALLY OPAQUE OPEN SENTENCES
§ 1 Introduction
We saw in the previous chapter that it is possible to
provide semantically sustainable truth conditions for sentences
of the form r (Ex)N^~\ where r (Ex) n is read rThere is something
x such that -1 . We have yet to see that it is possible to provide
semantically sustainable truth conditions for sentences of the
form r (Ex)Nlfcc_1
,
where rN#x_~1 is referentially opaque (by (Def. 6)
and (Cons.)).
In this chapter I shall endeavor to prove the possibility
in question. I shall try to show that you can quantify into
opaquely construed contexts of necessity and possibility, as
well as opaquely construed contexts of propositional attitude.
Pursuant to this end I shall work within imagined systems of
modal, epistemic, and doxastic logic. A semantics will be
constructed for fragments of each of these systems, within
which a number of inferences will be proved valid or invalid.
It is believed that our results intuitively validate existential
generalization rules for referentially opaque languages to
replace (EG
q ),
thereby answering Quine's challenge at the
conclusion of "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic."
Having shown what generalization rules may plausibly be put
forward in place of (EG^), we may then show what criteria
of the meaningfulne ss of open sentences may plausibly be
put forward in place of (0).
I next call attention to some striking analogies between
the approach to quantifying in, taken in this thesis, and a
certain theory of quantifying in, along Fregean lines.
Finally, I attempt to show that contingent identity systems
systems in which the theorem schema (12) is invalidated—are not
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semantically sustainable; that within such systems you cannot
meaningfully quantify into opaque contexts.
§ 2 A Semantics for a Modal Logic (L^
)
In the following pages I shall work within imagined systems
of modal, epistemic, and doxastic logic. The contemplated
systems bear conspicuous similarities to existing systems of
Jaakko Hintikka, especially with respect to the intended
interpretation of quantifiers, but they are also dissimilar
to Hintikka' s systems in some conspicuous respects. One
conspicuous dissimilarity between the two sets of systems
is that formulas of Hintikka' s systems are arbitrary formulas,
whereas formulas of the imagined systems are not arbitrary
formulas. This syntactical dissimilarity results in a
conspicuous dissimilarity in semantical approaches. Hintikka'
s
semantical approach to modal and epistemic logic utilizes
the notion of a model system : a set of model sets (sets of
formulas), related by what he calls the relation of
"alternativeness," which satisfy certain conditions of
consistency (or a property akin to consistency).
By contrast, the approach taken here is the more
familiar model-theoretic approach, utilizing the notion of
a model . Semantics will be constructed for fragments of
the contemplated modal, epistemic, and doxastic systems,
in which semantics models are defined for the three systems.
The important features of these semantics are due to
o
Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. Sleigh develops a semantics for an
epistemic system only. However, we can obtain interpreted
modal and doxastic systems by making certain changes in
Sleigh's presentation, which I follow rather closely.
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Th.© modal case will be considered first. The system will
be called "L^" . contains sentence letters: "p", "q"
f "r”
,
individual variables: "x", "y", "z", individual
constants: "a”, "b", "c", predicate letters: "F", "G"
,
"H", the dyadic predicate letter: "=" (read "is identical
with"); the modal operators: "M" and "N" (read, respectively,
"it is possible that" and "it is necessary that"); and any
adequate set of symbols in addition to the above.
Let "W" designate a nonempty set of worlds (w^ . .
.
,w. , . .
.
}
.
Let "L" designate a nonempty set of individuals (u
1 ,
. .
.
,u
i?
. .
.
}.
Let "R" stand for a dyadic reflexive relation defined over the
members of W. Let "Q" stand for a function which assigns to
each world a subset of L, such that Q(w^) = Ih . Let "V"
represent a binary function whose domain is sets of pairs,
where the first elements are formulas and the second elements
are worlds, and whose range is (l,0) (V is a valuation function ).
Let "I" represent a binary function whose domain is sets of
pairs, where the first elements are variables, constants and
predicate letters and the second elements are worlds, and whose
range is either D (where the expressions are either variables
or constants) or sets of n-tuples of elements of D (where the
expressions are predicate letters) (i is an interpretation
function ) . Let "V^" represent V determined by I.
Interpretation functions satisfy the following conditions:
(IF.1) For each variable x. and each world w^, l(x,w^) = u,
for some u in D; and for every w. and w., l(x,w.) = l(x,w.)
^ V ^ 0
(IF. 2) For each constant a_ and each world w^, l(a.»w^) = u,
for some u in D; and it is possible that l(a_,w.) 4 I (a,w .)
(IF. 3) For each n-ary predicate letter F and each world w^,
l(F,w^) = a set of n-tuples of elements of D (u^,...,u
n>
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Each interpretation function determines a unique valuation
function satisfying the following conditions:
1.
Atom i c formulas : For any n-ary predicate lette r F and
any terms (variables or constants^ t,....,t
, V (FCt + \ TT i
-1’
’-n’
v
l
vr •••»!_;, w. )
- 1 iff < l(t_^, l(_t^ ,w^ ) ) 0 l(F,w^)
2. jyi=j For any wff Of, V^-o^w. ) = 1 iff v^a,* ) = 0
3. ^jV7 For any wffs * and 0, w.) = 1 iff either
v
I
(«>w
i )
= 1 or V
I
(|S,w
i )
= 1
4. BjE? For any wff Of, V^Nc^v.) = 1 iff, for every w.
such that w.Rw., V t (Q!,w.) = 1i 3 I 3
5- ^XM7 F°r any wff a, VT (
rM0T,w. ) = 1 iff there is a wx 1 3
such that w.Rw. and V_(0?,w.) = 1i 3 I 3
BZB Por any wff & and any individual variable x,
Case 1: If no occurrence of x is within the scope of a modal
operator that in turn is within the scope of the quantifier
binding x, then
V
I (
r (x)oT,w
i )
= 1 iff, for any I’, if
(a) I* is like I except (possibly) at x
and (b) I' (x,w
i )
0 D
i
then = 1
Case 2: If there is an occurrence of x within the scope of a
modal operator that in turn is within the scope of the quantifier
binding x, then
w
^) = 1 iff, for any I', if
(a) I* is like I except (possibly) at x
and (b) I'(x,w^) e IK
and (c) for any w
,
if w.Rw., then I'(x,w.) e D
.
. .
3 1 J 3 3
then Vj(&,w^) = 1
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For any terms (variables or constants) t_. and tV r
-j = V’ w i> = 1 iff I(iy"± ) = 1(4,*.)
J
We note that any ordered quintuple <W,D,R,Q,I> meeting
the above conditions is a model for our simplified modal logic;
that V^w.) = 0 in case V^w.) 4 1; and that & is valid just
in case, for each I, V^w.) = 1, for each world w in each
model. 1
Our semantics validates the theorem schemata of L^:
( I:L ) ^ = where a is any individual constant
(2l)(2L)(2L = Z. - (^ fi) )~l j where x and are any
individual variables and Os and are any wffs, and a. and (3
differ only in that in one or more places where Ct has free x,
(3 has free ^
but does not validate the schema:
(1) ra = b D (06 D /3 )
-1
,
where a and b are any individual
constants and a and ft are any wffs, and Or and (3 differ only in
that in one or more places where ex. contains a., [3 contains b
The invalidity of (l) can be quickly proved. We note first
that the standard Rule of Necessitation:
(N) If a is a theorem, then rN0? is a theorem
is validity-preserving in 4. By (il) and (N), VjO'Nfa = a)»,w )
= 1
,
for each I and each world w
i
in each model. However, the
following conjunction is possible: V^'a = b",w ) = 1 and
Vj( ’a = b",w^) = 0 . This is so since, by (IP. 2), we have no
assurance that l(a,w^) = l(a,w ), for any constant a_ and any
two worlds w^ and w^. Consequently, the following conjunction
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is possible, V^-a = b-.v^ = 1 and V^'-Nfa = b)»,v.) = 0.
Consequently,
( 2 ) a = b D (N(a = a) D N(a = b))
is not valid in L^. But (2) is an instance of (l).
This result proves 1^ referentially opaque; for if (l) is
not valid, neither is (SIQ ) . Thus, by (Def. 6) and (Cons.),
there are open sentences of the form that are referentially
opaque in 1^. The crucial question that remains, and which
our semantics will help us to answer, is whether sentences of
the form rN^x“1 can be made sense of in spite of their opacity.
Before proceeding to a study of inferences in L^, I should
remark that—as the reader has already observed
—certain
qualifications on some previously defined terms are implicit
in the present semantical theory, which assigns truth values
to sentences in a given world or worlds
. Of note, a name
(constant) is to be understood as an expression which has
a unique reference in a world
. Furthermore, an expression
is a name if it has, as its unique reference in a world w
i *
any individual in D, not necessarily some individual in D^.
For example, "the number of planets" has nine as its
unique reference in the actual world, but it may have another
number as its unique reference in some other logically possible
world. The theory is therefore Fregean in the respect that it
countenances the possibility, at least, of shifts of reference.
It is non-Fregean in the respect that every free variable
within an opaque context bound by a quantifier from without
has for its value a member of the domain of individuals of the
world in which the quantification is true. Intuitively speaking,
this is the domain of existent individuals; individuals that
exist in the actual world.
On the other hand, we cannot assume that the domain of
individuals of any possible world, and notably the acutal
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world, is not a proper subset of the domain D. As we shall
see, we cannot account for the invalidity of certain inferences
without admitting the possibility, at least, of individuals
existing in some world other than the actual world. L is
therefore existence presuppositionless
, in the sense that its
constants may fail to denote any existent individual. But if
an expression is a constant, then it has a unique reference
in some world or other. Thus, "the author of Principia
Mathematica " is a constant if, in some logically possible
world, there is an individual who authors and does not co-
author Principia Mathematica
.
Therefore, although ra_ = a.""1 is true in every world, it
is possible that has no unique reference in every world.
Consequently, ra = a 1 does not imply, in 1^,
r (Ex)(x = a)n
.
(This can be proved as follows: Assume that V (ra = an ,w.)
= 1 and I^ajW^) ^ D^, for some world w^. Now V
I (
r (Ex)(x = a)"1
,
w^) = 1 only if there is some I' such that I'(x,w.) 6 J). ; and
^Ti(
r
^.
= £ ,w ) = 1 only if I' (x,w
. ) = I'(a,w. ). But these
two consequences jointly imply that I' (a,w
i ) £ , contrary
to our assumption.)
§ 3 Inferences in L
The principle (0) was intuitively justified, it will be
recalled, by the sentence : "If an open sentence expresses a
genuine condition on an object, then that open sentence is
true or false of that object, no matter how the object is
specified." We have already seen that this sentence, under
any plausible interpretation, is compatible with the sentence:
"An open sentence of the form rN'/'x-1 expresses a genuine
condition on an object." But the proof of this compatibility
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was consequent upon specifying every object either by descriptive
predicate or standard proper name. What if, as Quine intended,
specification be construed as naming, exclusively; and, furthermore,
a name of an object is any referring expression (notably, any
descriptive phrase) which has that object as its unique reference?
Then, in particular, the justificatory sentence would seem to
imply the sentence: "If an open sentence of the form rF^x~1
expresses a genuine condition on an object, then that open
sentence is true or false of that object, even though the object
is named by expressions that contingently denote it." Does this
last sentence express a proposition that is really intuitive?
I think that it does, but that it is also possible, consistently,
to affirm that proposition, without at the same time affirming
the principle (0) which it is intended to justify. I think
that it is possible, for example, consistently, to affirm
that "N(x is greater than five)" is true of the number of
planets, without at the same time affirming that "N(the number
of planets is greater than five)" is true, even where r'the
number of planets" is a name. The rationale for this belief
is found in
^
5
•
What I do not claim—and what is certainly false—is that
any name of the value of a variable in an open sentence of the
form ^x"1 is suitable as an instantiation of that variable.
We must distinguish between instantiatable names and non—
instantiatable names. Instantiatable names are precisely
those names which ne cessarily denote their objects. That a
name which contingently denotes its object is not a valid
instantiation of a variable in an open sentence of the form
rN^x
-1
can be accounted for as follows:
What our semantics says, intuitively, is that "(Ex)NFx"
is true (in the actual world), if and only if there is something
such that the open sentence "HFx" is true of it (in the actual
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world), and this implies that there is something such that the
open sentence "Fx" is true of it in_ every world possible with
~
-
Pe ct £2. actual w
-
orId (including the actual world, since
" R " is reflexive). In short, "(Ex)NFx" is true, if and only if
there is something such that it is F in every logically possible
world. The truth of "(Ex)NFx" implies, therefore, that the
value of its bound variable exists in every logically possible
world; and this implies the necessary existence of the value
of its bound variable. As such, the quantifier "(Ex)”, whose
variable falls within the scope of "N», is to be understood
as saying: "There is some necessarily existent thing x such
that."
Now consider the problem of specifying an object that
satisfies the open sentence "NFx". Let us suppose, contrary
to what I said earlier, that any name of the value of "x" in
the open sentence "NFx" is admissible as an instantiation of
that variable. Let us suppose, therefore, that "NFx" is true
of some object, if there is some name such that replacing its
free variable by that name would render "NFx" true (cf. Quine's
criterion (ii)). Then, if "NFa" is some true sentence, then
—
on the present supposition—"NFx" is true of some object;
namely, the object denoted by "a". But it can be shown that
this condition never holds in L^.
Case 1 NFa
(Ex)NFx
1 V
I
("NPa",w ) = 1
2 V
I
("(Ex)NFx",w
i )
= 0
3 V ("Fa" ,w
. ) = 1I 0
4 I("a",w .) 6 l("F",w .)
J J
Assumption for reduotio
/i
/3
That is, I assigns to "a" in every world w., where w.Rw., some
member or other of D which is one of those elements assigned by
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I to "F" in w .
.
3
5 V
;[
("(x)M~Fx",w ) = 1
6 V
II (»M~Fx”,w ) = 1
7 V
I)
(»-.Fx'*,w ) = 1
8 I' ("x",w ) e I* ("~F",w .)
3 3
That is, I» assigns to "~F" in some world w., where w.Rw.
i) i i ^every member of IK that i s also a. member of D. (for I* ("xn ,w. )
e IK and I'("x",w^) 6 IK (by definition of universal
generalizations), and I'("x",w ) = I*("x»,w.) (by (iF.l)).
Now it may appear that 4 and 8 conflict. If everything
is a member of I'("~F",w.), then is not the individual assigned
to "a" a member of I' ("~F" ,w )? Not necessarily, for it is,
after all, everything in D that is a member of I'("~F",w.)-
Suppose that "Fa" is interpreted as "The author of Waverley
is an author." Then we may agree that "NFa" is true. Now
we want to show that " (Ex)NFx"—that is, "There is something
that is necessarily an author"—is not a consequence of our
premise. If we are right, then the sentence, "Necessarily,
the author of Waver ley is an author," is compatible with
the sentence, "Everything is possibly not an author." Now
I believe that both of these sentences have true, and hence
compatible, interpretations. It is easy to imagine a world
in which none of us, including the author of Waver ley—that
is, Scott—authors. Call this world "w.". Since, in w.,
3 3
*
none of us authors, and yet "The author of Waver ley is an
author" is true in w^, then "the author of Waver ley" does
not denote, in w., any of us (including, of course, the
author (in this world) of Waver ley )
.
Nothing in our semantics precludes this state of affairs;
for assignments to constants are liable to branching (by (IF.2)),
and it is possible that u, 6 D . and u 4 D.. The formal picture
0 ic i
/2
/5
/6
/7
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is this: Suppose there are n elements in D .
. Then, by 7,
every member, of D_^ is a member of I)
.
. Then,
by 8, every member, u^, ...,u
n
,
of D_. is assigned by I» to
'~F" in w^. That is, u
1
,**«,u
n
e I' ("~F" ,w ) . Now, by 4,
I assigns to "a" in some member u
k of D which is one of
those elements assigned by I to "F" in w .
. That is, u e
l("F",Wj). But we cannot conclude that u^ £ I'("~F",w.),
for it is possible that u
k ft Therefore,
3
Case 1 is invalid.
The result is completely intuitive, for as we explained
earlier, "NFx" is satisfiable only by something that necessarily
exists
; that is, something that exists in every logically possible
world. It follows from the truth of "NFa" that, in every
logically possible world, "a" denotes something or other.
It does not follow from the truth of "NFa" that something or
other is such that, in every logically possible world, "a"
denotes it. But the latter, and not the former, condition
is required before we can validly exchange any occurrence of
"a" inside the scope of "N" for a free (bindable) variable,
given the interpretation of "NFx".
Thus, in order to existentially generalize on "the author
of Waverley " in the sentence, "Necessarily, the author of
Waverley is an author," we require the added condition:
"There is something which is necessarily the author of Waver ley"
(in symbols, "(Ex)N(x = a)"). Now it' is certain that the
sentence, "Necessarily, the author of Waverley is an author,
and there is something which is necessarily the author of
Waverley ," is not compatible with the sentence, "Everything
is possibly not an author;" for everything
,
in this instance,
must include an individual who, according to what was just
said, exists and authors in every logically possible world.
94
The proof proceeds as follows:
Case 2 NFa & (Bx)U(x = a)
(Ex)NFx
1 V
I (
MNPa",w. ) = 1
)
3 V
I (
,
'(Ex)NPx",w
i )
= 0 )
Since Case 2 is exactly like Case 1 except for "(Ex)N(x = a ),'»
we may save some steps. By the attempted proof of Case 1, we
derive
4
I("a",w ) e l("F",w.)
J
and
5
I'("x",w ) e I'("~F",w.)
3 J
As we saw. Case 1 is invalid, since it is possible that I
assigns to "a" in w^. some member of D distinct from every
member of D assigned by I' to "x" in w^.. Consequently, if
Case 2 is valid, then I assigns to "a" in w.. some member of
D not distinct from every member of D assigned by I' to "x"
in Wj. Line 2 of the proof should ensure this.
By definition:
Vj( (Ex)N(x = a)" ,w^ ) = 1 iff there is some sequence I'
such that
(a) I' is like I except at "x"
(b) I'("x",w.) e D.
(c) for any w^., if w^Rw.., then I'("x",w.) e T)
.
and Vj
,
("N(x = a)",w
i )
= 1
Hence
,
6 Vj, ( ,rN(x = a)",w i ) = 1 /2
7 V
T
,(-x = a”, Wj ) = 1 /6
8 I'("x",w ) = I' ("a" ,w . ) /7J 0
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Line 8 tells us that in every world w., where w.Rw., I'
assigns to "a" one of the members of D that I* assigns to
"x”. But I’("x",w.) 6 D. and P(V,w.) 6 D. (by (b) and
(c) of the definition above), and I'("x",w.) = I'(" X",w )(by (iP.l)). Thus, the individual assigned to "a" in w^
is some member u^ of D. that is also a member of D . . B^t
every member of IK, according to 5, is a member of I'("»«P",w.),
Consequently,
^
6 I’("~F",w.). But, by 4
,
u
k e l("F",w.)’.
^
That is, one and the same individual is both F and not P^
m Wy But that is impossible. Therefore, Case 2 is valid.
There can be no doubt that the following inference
is valid, and a proof is omitted:
Case 3 MFa &, (Ex)N(x = a)
(Ex)MFx
However, we can show that "(Ex)H(x = a)" is not only
sufficient, but necessary, as a condition for existentially
generalizing on "a" in "MPa".
If V
I
("(Ex)MPx",w
i )
= 1, then VIt ("Fx",w^) = 1, for
some w
,
where w.Rw.. That is, there is some world w
.J x J j
*
alternative to w^, such that some member of D . that is
also a member of IK is assigned to "F" in w^. (intuitively,
something in the actual world is P in some possible world
(not necessarily the actual world).)
Suppose that "MPa" states a sufficient condition for
the derivation of "(Ex)KFx". If V
I
("KFa",w
i )
= 1, then
V ("Fa",w ) = 1, for some w
,
where w.Rw.. That is, there
J J 1 J
is some alternative possible world w., such that I assigns
to "a" in w, one of those members of D that I assigns to
"F" in w... But it is possible that l("a",w
i ) ^
D.
.
(intuitively,
"a" may not denote anything in the actual world.) Hence, the
truth of "MPa" does not ensure us that there is some world w.,
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alternative to v
±
,
such that a member of D. that is also a
member of D is assigned to "F" in w .
^
1 *3 *
Suppose that "(Ex)(x = a)”, in conjunction with "MFa"
,
states a sufficient condition for the derivation. If
VjO'CExHx = a)",*.) = 1, then T
r
,(»i = a",w.) == 1. Hence,
I' (
Ma",w
i ) 6 . But it is possible that I'("x",w.)
;
and henoe that Vj.h = a",w.) = 0. (intuitively, something
that exists in the actual world may not exist in any other
world.) Clearly, the condition we seek still eludes us.
Suppose that " (Ex)M(x = a)", in conjunction with "MFa",
states a sufficient condition for the derivation. If
V
];
("(Ex)M(x = a)",w
i )
= 1, then V^O'x = a",w.) = 1, for
some Wj, where w^Rw... Now we are assured that there is some
alternative world w such that a member of D
. that is also a3 3
member of is assigned the same element to which "a" is
assigned in w. and w... However we have no assurance that
this world is one in which I' assigns to "a", and hence to
"x"
,
one of the elements (if any) which I' assigns to "F".
( Ifi'ku i t ive ly , a exists in the actual world as well as some
possible world, but this world may not be one in which a
(or anything else) is F.
)
Clearly, we are guaranteed that a is something in the
actual world which, in some possible world, is F, only if
we are guaranteed that a exists in this world as well as
the alternative worlds. Hence the necessity as well as
the sufficiency of "(Ex)N(x = a)".
Our semantics therefore validates the following
existential generalization rule for the system :
97
(EOj) From a and r(Ex)N(x = ajl, infer r (Ex)fP, where
x is any individual variable, a is any individual constant,
and 01 is any wff containing an occurrence of a inside the
scope of a single modal operator, and (3 differs from a only
in that in one or more places where ot contains a, [3 contains
free x
As indicated, (EG^ applies to sentences containing nonreiterated
modalities. Problems of reiterated modalities are beyond the
scope of this thesis.
$ 4 A Semantics for an Epistemic Logic (L^
)
serves as a model for the contemplated epistemic and
doxastic systems. The epistemic case is considered next. The
system will be called "Lg". contains all primitive elements
of Lp except that "N" and "M" are replaced by the epistemic
operators "K" and "P". I shall deal with the simplified case
of a single knower, who shall be called "Tom". "K " and "P "
t t
may be read, respectively, as "Tom knows that" and "it is
possible, for all that Tom knows, that." More accurately,
however, »K
t
" should be read as "it is a logical consequence
of what Tom knows that" (see (K) below).
The semantics for results from the semantics for
by: (1) redefining "R" as a dyadic reflexive and transitive
relation defined over the members of W; and (2) replacing,
in rules 1 through 7, every occurrence of "17" by "K " every
occurrence of "M" by "P^"
,
and every occurrence of "modal"
by "epistemic."
Consequently, (II) and (12) are valid, and (1) is invalid,
in L^. Similarly, the correlate of (N):
(K) If Ct is a theorem, then r*K^oTl is a theorem
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is validity-preserving in 1^. ((K) is unexceptionable if
"V iS interpreted as -it is a logical consequence of what
Tom knows that.")
Consequently, the attempted proof and the proof of
Case 1
• K
t
Pa
(Ex)K
t
Fx
and
Case 2
> K
t
Fa J: (Ex)K
t
(x = a)
(Ex)K^Fx
follow the same steps as those of Case 1 and Case 2, respectively,
the appropriate operator substitutions having been made.
We can also demonstrate, by an argument analogous to
one presented in §3, that ”(Ex)K
t
(x = a)” states a necessary
and sufficient condition for existentially generalizing on "a"
in the sentence H P Fa".
X
Thus, the semantics validates the following existential
generalization rule for the system L^:
(E0
2 )
From a and r(Ex)K
t
(x = a)"1
,
infer r(Ex)
J
g'', where
x is any individual variable, a is any individual constant,
and OC is any wff containing an occurrence of a inside the
scope of a single epistemic operator, and differs from Oc
only in that in one or more places where Oc contains a, @
contains free x
As the preceding discussion verifies, logical implications
in are exactly those of L^, given uniform substitution of
"W" for "K
t
" and "M" for "P
t
" throughout. Nevertheless, the
two sets of formulas clearly have different meanings. One way
to understand this difference in meaning is to understand the
difference in the meaning of an "alternative world" in each
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semantical theory (where a world w. is alternative to a world
w^, if w^Rw^).
An alternative world in epistemic logic, unlike modal
logic, is not simply any world possible with respect to the
base world (intuitively, the actual world). It is quickly
seen that if this were the case, then, by all and only
logically necessary truths are known, a consequence that is
surely unacceptable, from an intuitive point of view. The
notion of an alternative world in epistemic logic is rather
that of any world possible with respect to what someone or
other knows (in the actual world). In our simplified system,
we are concerned only with what the person Tom knows and
does not know. We might call the alternative worlds in our
logic t—epistemically possible worlds” (worlds possible with
respect to what Tom knows (in the actual world)). Clearly,
the set of all t-epistemically possible worlds is a proper
subset of the set of all logically possible worlds.
Intuitively, then, what our semantics says is that
" (Ex)K^.Px” is true, if and only if there is something such
that it is P in every t-epistemically possible world. The
truth of " (Ex)K
t
Fx” implies, therefore, that the value of
its bound variable exists in every t-epistemically possible
world; and this implies the known (to Tom) existence of
the value of its bound variable. As such, the quantifier
"(Ex)”, whose variable falls within the scope of ”K ”,
should be understood as saying something likes ’’There is
something x, whose identity Tom knows
,
such that.”
Proceeding to the problem of specifying an object that
satisfies the open sentence "K^Fx”
,
we find that the situation
is analogous to that described in §3. In brief, if a name "a”
is suitable as an instantiation of the variable in the open
sentence ”K
t
Fx”, then there is something such that, in every
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t—epistemically possible world, »a" denotes it; in symbols,
H (Ex)K
t
(x = a)" .
§5 A Dilemma of Quine 1 s Resolved
Enough has been said to substantiate that the following
inference is valid in L-^
:
Case 4 NFa & (Ex)N(x = a)
(Ex)(N(x = a) & RFx)
But the proof follows:
1 V ("NFa" ,w
. ) = 1
2 V
I
("(Bx)N(x = a)",v ) = 1
3 V
I (
,, (Bx)(W(x = a) & KPx) ,, ,w
i )
= 0
4 V^(" (x) (~N(x = a) v ~NFx)",w. ) = 1
5 Vj l ( ,,~N‘(x = a) v ~NFx ,, ,w^) = 1
6 Either
Assumption for reductio
/3
/4
Vj
t
("~K(x = a)",w ) = 1
or /5
Vj, ( ,,-NFx",w
i )
= 1
7 Vj.O'Ntx = a)%Wl ) = 1 /2
8 V
I1
(' ,
-UFx",w.) = 1 /6,7
But 1, 7, and 8 are jointly impossible, for they imply that
some individual is both F and not F in some logically possible
world. I note that Hintikka's semantics, in "Existential
Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions,"^ validates
the corresponding arbitrary formula:
r (NFa & (Ex)N(x = a)) d (Ex)(N(x = a) L RFx)"1
(1) rNPan e /J. 6 Q
(2) r (Ex)N(x = a) -1 e li
(3) r (x)(M(x / x) v -NPx) -1 £ JJ.
Assumption for reductio
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from (3) by (c.t^)
(C.self=/)
/4,5
(4) rM (
/
a.) v ~NFa) n £ fl
(5) r~M(a. / a)
-1
e fJL
. (6) ^NFa"1 e }JL
But (1) and (6) violate (c.~).
Based upon what was said in §4, it follows that the analogue
of Case 4 is valid in :
Case 4' K
t
Fa & (Ex)K
t
(x = a)
(Ex)(K
t
(x = a) & K
t
Fx)
Now it will be noted that "(Ex)n(x = a)" and "(Ex)K (x = a)"
both imply, in their respective systems, "(Ex)(x = a)". This
is so, since "R" (the alternativeness relation) is reflexive
in and The implication is provable as follows: If
V
I (
r(Ex) At (x = a)'1 ,w i ) = 1, then, for some I', VI ,( rx = a.n,w.)
= 1, for every w j( where w.Hw^. But w.Rw., Hence, V (^ = a3,w.)
= 1. Hence, by definition, V
I (
r(Ei)(x = a)"1,*.) = 1. Therefore/
since Case 4 and Case 4' are valid, so too are:
Case 5 NFa & (Ex)N(x = a)
(Ex) (x = a L NFx)
and
Case 5* K
t
Pa & (Ex)K
t
(x = a)
(Ex) (x = a & E
t
Fx)
The preceding results are not very startling, but they
are useful in helping us to resolve a familiar kind of dilemma
posed by Quine, which has important bearing on the question of
the meaningfulness of referentially opaque open sentences.
From "Reference and Modality":
(15) 9 is necessarily greater than 7
(18) The numoer of planets is necessarily greater than 7
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(24) The number of planets = 9
(30) (Ex)(x is necessarily greater than 7 )
¥hat is this number which, according to (30), is necessarilygreater than 7? According to ( 15 ), from which (30) wasinferred, it was 9
,
that is, the number of planets; but tosuppose this would conflict with the fact that (18) is false
.
4
Prom such dilemmas as this one, Quine derives support for
his contention that referentially opaque open sentences do not
express genuine conditions on objects and are therefore meaningless.
He concludes that since "the number of planets" is not validly
substitutive for "9" in ( 15 ), given ( 24 ), the open sentence,
'
"x is necessarily greater than 7 ," is not true or false of any
number at all.
But Quine's inference is invalid, insofar as ( 15 ), (18),
(24), and (30) are interpreted sentences of any modal logic.
Specifically, in 1^, (15) and (24) do not imply (18); yet
the conditions under which "x is necessarily greater than 7 "
is true or false of an object are precisely defined in the
semantics. Unless these conditions are objectionable from
an intuitive point of view—and I have endeavored to establish
the contrary—the principle ( 0 ) must be regarded as false.
I said in Chapter IV, § 4 , that (0) was intuitively
justified by a kind of sentence that one finds in various
places in Quine's writings; namely: "If an open sentence
expresses a genuine condition on an object, then that open
sentence is true or false of that object, no matter how the
object is specified." I believe that this sentence expresses
a proposition that is. genuinely intuitive, even where (l)
"specification" is construed as naming, exclusively, and
(2) a name of an object is any referring expression which
has that object as its unique reference. But I have argued
that (0) is false. Therefore, I am committed to the belief
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that it is possible that an open sentence expresses a genuine
condition on an object and is therefore true or false of that
object, no matter how the object is named, although some of
these names are not valid instantiations of the free variable
of that open sentence. This belief requires a rationale that
I can now provide, thereby resolving Quine-like dilemmas of
the kind illustrated above.
Specifically with regard to 1^, I am committed to the
belief that an open sentence of the form rNfe~1 or rK£x~'
expresses a genuine condition on an object and is therefore
true or false of that object, even though the object is
named by expressions that cont ingently denote it. By a
name a's contingently denoting its object, it is meant that
the name satisfies the condition r (Ex)(x = a)*1 but does not
satisfy the condition r(Ex)N(x = a)"1
. It is not true, as
we know, that a name which contingently denotes its object
can be validly generalized on (instantiated to) inside the
scope of a modal operator. Nevertheless, the value of a
variable is denoted as truly by a name that is not generalizable
on as by a name that is generalizable on. Thus, the object
that make s
(1) (Ex)N(x is greater than 7)
true is the number of planets if it is nine. But this
assertion does not commit us to the truth of
(2) N(the number of planets is greater than 7),
even though we be committed to the truth of
(3) N(9 is greater than 7)
and
(4) The number of planets = 9;
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for (0) does not hold for Ve have nevertheless the means
to render intelligible, within Lp the identity of the number
of planets with the object that makes (1) true. These means
take the form of a sentence that is implied, in L by any
premise that implies ( 1 ) by the rule (EOj). Suppose this
premise is
(5) N(9 is greater than 7) & (Ex)N(x = 9 ).
Then, since Case 5 is valid, (5) validly implies, in L
,
( 6 ) (Ex)(x = 9 & N(x is greater than 7)).
But ,, 9" is free from the scope of any modal operators in ( 6 )
and consequently occurs purely referentially in ( 6 ), in the
sense of (Def
. 5). This enables us to infer, in
,
(7) (Ex) (x = the number of planets & N(x is greater than 7 ))
from (6) and ( 4 ). Quite straightforwardly, then, ( 7 ) identifies
the object which is necessarily greater than 7 as the number
of planets, without implying the untoward consequence ( 2 ).
The same maneuver works within resolving Quine-like
dilemmas for epistemic logic. An example of a valid conclusion
might be
(8) (Ex) (x = the approaching man & Aristotle is musica1 ))
from the premises,
(9) KAristotle (Corisou3 ls "“Sisal) & (Ex )KAristotle (x “ Coriscus)
and
( 10 ) The approaching man = Coriscus.
Although "the approaching man" is a name by which Aristotle
does not know Coriscus, if the open sentence, "K (x isAristotle
musical)," is true of Coriscus, then it is true of the approaching
man, they being identical. Again, we are not committed to the
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consequence
,
O 1 ) KAristotle^ the aPPr°aching nan is musical).
The same maneuver works within Ly resolving Quine-likedilemmas for doxastic logic, as may now be seen.
f 6 A Semantics for a Doxastic Logic (L^)
The doxastic case will now be considered. The system will
be called "Ly
. contains all primitive elements of L,, except
that "N" and "M" are replaced by the doxastic operators "B" and
C . Again, we deal with the simplified case of a single
believer, who again shall be called "Tom". "By and "C "
may be read, respectively, as "Tom believes that" and "it is
compatible with all that Tom believes that." More accurately,
however, "By should be read as "it is a logical consequence
of what Tom believes that" (see (b) below).
The semantics for results from the semantics for
by: (l) redefining "R" as a dyadic transitive relation
defined over the members of W; and ( 2 ) replacing, in rules
1 through 7, every occurrence of "N" by "By, every occurrence
of "M" by "Cy
,
and every occurrence of "modal" by "doxastic."
Consequently, (II) and (12) are valid, and (l) is invalid,
in L^. Similarly, the correlate of (N):
(B) If a is a theorem, then rB
t
oT' is a theorem
is validity-preserving in .
Consequently, the attempted proof and the proof of
Case 1 1 ' B Fa
X
(Ex)Byx
and
B Fa &. (Ex)B (x = a)
X X
(Ex)Byx
Case 2 1
1
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follow the same steps as those of Case 1 and Case 2, respectively,
the appropriate operator substitutions having been made. (For
further discussion of Case 2", see below.)
We can also demonstrate, by an argument analogous to one
presented in $ 3 , that »(Ez)B
t
(x = a)" states a necessary and
sufficient condition for existentially generalizing on "a" in
the sentence "C,Fa".
X
Thus, the semantics validates the following existential
general izat ion rule for the system :
(EG
3a ) From 0c and
r(Ex)B
t
(x = a)"', infer ‘(Ex)^, where
X is any individual variable, a. is any individual constant,
and 0c is any wff containing an occurrence of a inside the
scope of a single doxaatic operator, and {3 differs from Qt
only in that in one or more places where Oc. contains a,
ft
contains free x
The meanings of doxastic formulas, like epistemic formulas,
may be explained via the notion of an alternative world in
doxastic logic. Specifically, we might call the alternative
worlds of our doxastic logic "t-doxastically possible worlds"
(worlds possible with respect to what Tom believes (in the
actual world)).
Intuitively, what our semantics says is that "(Ex)B Fx"
X
is true, if and only if there is something such that it is
F in every t-doxastically possible world. The truth of
"(Ex)B
t
Fx" implies, therefore, that the value of its bound
variable exists in every t-doxastically possible world; and
this implies the believed (by Tom) existence of the value
of its bound variable. As such, the quantifier "(Ex)", whose
variable falls within the scope of "B^", should be understood
as saying something like: "There is something x, about whose
identity Tom has a belief
,
such that."
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Proceeding to the problem of specifying an object that
satisfies the open sentence "B
t
Fx«, we find that the situation
is analogous to that described in $ 3 . In brief, if a name
"a" is citable as an instantiation of the variable in the
open sentence "B^’x", then there is something such that, in
every t-doxastically possible world,
-a” denotes it; in symbols
" (Ex)B
t
(x = a)".
I note that in some logical systems, Case 2'' is invalid.
The invalidity is held to turn on the irreflexivity of doxastic
operators. But it will be observed that that the proof of
Case 2 depends in no way upon the ref lexivity of R in L^.
Furthermore, Case 2 * * seems thoroughly intuitive, whether "a"
denotes anything in the actual world or not. Suppose "Pa"
is read as "Sherlock Holmes is a great detective." Then
what the premise of Case 2" says is: "Tom believes that
Sherlock Holmes is a great detective, and there is someone
whom Tom believes (mistakenly) to be Sherlock Holmes." This
sentence seems to imply, unequivocally; "There is someone
whom Tom believes to be a great detective." The premise
ensures that in every world compatible with what Tom believes,
"Sherlock Holmes" names some existent individual. Consequently,
any world in which "Sherlock Holmes" does not name an existent
individual (the actual world and other possible worlds) is not
a world compatible with what Tom believes. Nevertheless, I
concede a certain perversity in saying that we have here
existentially generalized on "Sherlock Holmes." In the end,
we may wish to refer to the rule (EG, ) otherwise than asjd.
an EG rule
.
Irreflexivity comes into play when we consider the doxastic
correlate of Case 5*
B^Fa fic (Ex)B^.(x = a)Case 5 '
'
(Ex)(x = a fic B^Fx)
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Of course it is not acceptable that our premise, in the
paragraph above, should have the consequence that there is
someone identical with Sherlock Holmes whom Tom believes to
be a great detective. But Case 5" is invalid in the semantics,
for the reason that »(Ex)B
t
(x = a)" does not imply ..(Ex )(x „ a) „.
This is so because, from the fact that V
If (
r
x = a
~V ) = 1
for every w^, where wJlw.., we cannot infer that V
,
(^x = an ,w )
1; since R is not reflexive (that is, it is no/true that
Wi^i ^ *
The semantical requirement for validly inferring
"(Ex)(x = a & B
t
Fx)» by existential generalization is that
the constant "a" be assigned in the base world
,
as well as
in every alternative to the base world, some individual in
the domain of that world. This requirement is fulfilled by
(Ex)(x a & fl
t
(x = a))". Thus, the semantics validates
the following existential generalization rule for L
3
:
(EG
3b ) From Oc and
r(Ex)(x = a & B
t
(x = a))"1
,
infer
r(Ex)(x = a & /3)~1 f where x is any individual variable, a is
any individual constant, and Oc is any wff containing an
occurrence of a. inside the scope of a single doxastic operator,
and {3 differs from Oc only in that in one or more places where
Oc contains a, /3 contains free x
§ 7 Truth Conditions for Existential Quantifications
in Lj
,
Lpy and L
3
The key to truth conditions for existential quantifications
in Lp Ly and Ly as well as to criteria of meaningfulness of
open sentences in these languages, lies in their EG rules.
Truth conditions for existential quantifications in
may be put as follows:
i
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(v) An existential quantification holds in L if there
is a constant a whose substitution for the variable of
quantification would render the matrix true, and, if the
variable of quantification occurs anywhere in the matrix
inside the scope of a single modal operator, then
r (Ex)N(x = a) n is true.
A statement of truth conditions for existential quantifications
^2 resu lts "by replacing, in (v), every occurrence of "L " by
"V» every occurrence of "modal'* by "epistemic", and everj
occurrence of "F* by "K
t
". The resulting statement is (vi).
The doxastic case is somewhat more complicated, owing to
the case of quantifications of the form r (Ex)(x = a & 0)1, where
/3 contains free x inside the scope of a doxastic operator. The
result of substituting some constant a for the variable of
quantification may render the matrix true; but the conjunction
of this closed formula with r (Ex)B
t
(x = a)“» does not provide
a sufficient condition for the inference of a quantification
of the previously mentioned form. For any sentence of the
form ra = a"1 is true, by (II), whether a denotes anything in
the actual world or not. Thus, using the illustration of § 6,
we may assume the truth of the sentences: "Sherlock Holmes =
Sherlock Holmes, and Tom believes that Sherlock Holmes is a
great detective" ("a = a & B^Fa" ) and "There is someone whom
Tom believes to be Sherlock Holmes" ("(Ex)B (x = a)"). But
these sentences do not imply, in L^, the sentence: "There
is someone identical with Sherlock Holmes whom Tom believes
to be a great detective" ("(Ex)(x = a & B Fx)").
t
Truth conditions for existential quantifications in
may be put as follows:
(vii) An existential quantificat ion holds in if
there is a constant si whose substitution for the variable
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of quantification would render the matrix true, and
(a) if the variable of quantification occurs anyone
in the matrix inside but not outside the scope of a
single doxastic operator, then r (Ex)B
t
(x = a)"1 is true,
or (b) if the variable of quantification occurs anywhere
in the matrix both inside and outside the scope of a
single doxastic operator, then r (Ex)(x = a i. B (x « a )p
is true
.
J 8 Criteria of the Meaningfulness of Open Sentences
i 1*2 » and- L
Quine’s principle (o) says, in effect, that, if and only
if a sentence <£a passes the (unrestricted) substitutivity test,
does the truth of#a_ imply the satisfiability of <£x. In other
words, a name is a valid instantiation of a free variable of
any meaningful (satisfiable ) open sentence, if and only if the
name can be validly substituted for any other name, in accordance
with the rule (SIQ ). This bicondition simply does not hold in
general. It has been shown that a name a is a valid instantiation
of some open sentences in L^, L^, and L^, whenever certain
existence conditions are satisfied; namely, those given by
(ExjN(x = _a)~’, r (Ex)K^.(3c = ja)""1
,
r (Ex)B^.(x^ = aj -1
,
and
n(Ex) (x = a fie B
t
(x = a)) -1
.
Nevertheless, an analogue to Quine's (0) is constructable
for each of our languages, and one may indeed use these analogues
as criteria of the meaningfulness of open sentences in these
languages, although they are of more formal than intuitive
interest
.
Again, the modal case will serve as our model:
(0L ) Every meaningful open sentence <Px of 1^ is interpretable
in L
^
Ill
where
(Def. 9) An open sentence is interpre table in L
,
if
and. only if: 1
Case 1: If i does not occur inside the scope
of any modal operator, then 2>x is referentially
transparent (see (Def. 6)).
Case 2: If x occurs inside the scope of a
single modal operator, then, for all names a and
if ^ = k"
1
,
r (Ex)N(x = a)"1
,
r (Ex)N(x= b)l,
and£a are all true, then is true.
(0L^ resultB >>y replacing, in (0 ), every occurrence of
"L
l"
by V’ where a definition of interpretabili tv in l
results by replacing, in (Def. 9)> every occurrence of "modal”
by "epistemic" and every occurrence of "N" by "K "
. The
resulting definition is (Def. 10).
Again, the analogue for is more complicated to state:
re3ults by replacing, in (0^ ), every occurrence of »I»
by "L
3
", where 1 .
1
(Def. 11)
and only if:
Case 1: If x does not occur inside the scope
of any doxastic operator, then is referentially
transparent
.
Case 2: If 1 occurs inside but not outside the
scope of a single doxastic operator, then, for
• all names a and b, if na = b~\ r (Ex)B
t
(x = a)"1
,
r (Ex)B
t
(x = b)*1
,
and ^a are all true, then $b
is true
.
Case 3: If x occurs both inside and outside
the scope of a single doxastic operator, then,
for all names a and b, if ra = b"1
,
r (Ex)(x = a
An open sentence <}>x is interpretable in
,
if
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& B
t
(x = a))->, r(Ex) (x = b & B
t
(x = b))-\ and
#a are all true, then is true.
Instances of Case 2 of (Bef. 11), involving nondenoting
names, may occur when a and b are identical constants.
Intuitively, what the definitions of interpretability in
L
x
-L
3
tell us is that a name b must have the same reference
as a name a in every relevant world before we can validly
substitute b for a in any substitution instance of any open
sentence in any of the languages. Formally, the picture
(greatly simplified) for all cases other than the referentially
transparent case is this: If ra = b"
1
is true in w.
,
then,
by /yjzJt some member of D (not necessarily 1^) is assigned
to both a and b_ in w^. But if the existence conditions hold,
then by results with which we are by now familiar—there is
some member uk of such that uk is assigned to both a and
in every world w (not necessarily w.), where w.Rw. (u is
^ ^ l j k
assigned to ji and b_ in w^ in every case except Case 2 of (Def.
11)). Consequently, for any predicate letter F to which the value
of (uk ) is assigned in any world w., where w.Rw., the value
/ \ J J
of _b (u, ) is assigned to F in w .
.
K “3
5 9 Analogues in Kaplan* s *'Quantifying In"
5In "Quantifying In," David Kaplan proposes as an analysis
of the sentence
(1) There is something x such that, necessarily, x is greater
than five
the sentence
(2) (Ex)(Ea.) ( A N (a_> x ) & N
r
aL is greater than five”1 )
In this formulation, "A" is a dyadic predicate, with " A (a
,
x)"
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reading "a denotes x.» The subscripted symbol "N" stands for
the adverb "necessarily,- with " A^" reading "denotes necessarily.
The symbols " r " and " n " are, for all practical purposes,
Quine's quasi-quotation marks. The second occurrence of "N"
is therefore an occurrence of a one-place predicate, to be
read "is necessary." Other symbols are by now familiar
(Kaplan uses where I use "a").
(2) is not an example of quantification into an opaque
context in the usual sense that a variable x occurs within
and without an opaque context. Kaplan's formulation is Pregean
in spirit, and as we have already noted (Chapter III, $12),
quantification into opaque contexts, in the usual sense, is
impossible within Frege's theory. Although it is true that
(2) is an instance of quantification into an opaque context,
it is not true that ( 2 ) is open to Quine's charge of
meaninglessness; for the open sentence "A (... x .. V'N ’
is referentially transparent. To illustrate:
1 (Ex) (Esl) ( A ^(a, x) & N
ra is greater than five"1 )-
2 (Eji) ( A ^(a., nine ) & N
r
a is greater than five”1 )
3 The number of planets = nine
imply
4 (Ea) (
A
N
(a_, the number of planets) & N ra_ is greater
than five"1 )
On the other hand, the open sentence " A
^
( • • • j* . .
.
)" is
not referentially transparent. Consonant with Frege's theory,
all referring expressions which have unique references are
construed as names; but in the absence of any mark distinguishing
standard from nonstandard referential occurrences of names,
it is easy to show that (SI^) is invalid:
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5 (Ex) ( A jj("nine" , x) & N
r
nine is greater than five”1 )
6 The number of planets = nine
do not imply
7 (Ex)(A N ("the number of planets", x) & N rthe number
of planets is greater than five"1 )
But 7 is no paradox, for as Quine has said, "the principle of
substitutivity /[SI
(>}7 should not be extended to contexts
in which the name to be supplanted occurs without referring
simply to the object;" 6 and clearly, in its first occurrence
in 5 ( as well as its second), "nine" does not refer to the
object nine. Nor is there any reason to believe that open
sentences, whose variables range over expressions, are meaningless
because they are referentially opaque.
Having established that (2) is unobjectionable from the
point of view of the transparency and opacity of its open
sentences, it remains to be shown that (2) does indeed formulate
(l). Equally unobjectionable from the point of view of the
transparency and opacity of its open sentences is the similar
sentence
,
(3) (Ex)(EaJ(A (cl, x) & N r_a is greater than five"1 ).
But it can be shown that sentences of the general form,
(4) There is something x such that, necessarily, ... x ...,
are not analyzable as sentences of the general form,
(5) (Ex)(Ea)( A (a,x) & N r ... a ... n ).
For to satisfy (5), a name occurring within a modal context
need simply denote its object. But
(6) (Ex)( A ("Scott", x) &. N rScott = Scott -1 )
is true ; hence
,
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( 7 ) (Ex)(Ea)( A (a,x) & N ra = Scott"1 )
is true. But
(8) There is something x such that, necessarily, x = Scott
is false, since (8) asserts that Scott necessarily exists.
Kaplan's analysis of sentences of the general form (4)
implies a relation between the value of its bound variable
and some name of the object. He concludes that the correct
analysis of sentences of the form (4) implies that this
relation is one of necessary denotation. In other words,
any name a on which we generalize to obtain a sentence that
is an analysis of some sentence of the form (4) must satisfy
the condition " (Ex)
A
N (a,x)", and not merely the condition
" (Ex)A (a,x)".
Hence, the correct analysis of (8), according to Kaplan,
is
( 9 ) (Ex)(Ea)( A N (a,x) & N
ra = Scott”1 ).
If ( 9 ) is the correct analysis of (8), then there is no name
such that instantiating the open sentence "A (... a ...)'*
to that name results in a true sentence. But of course no
such name exists; for if an object doss not necessarily exist,
then no name necessarily denotes it.
Clearly, Kaplan's conclusions are intimately related to
our conclusions in §§2 and 3, concerning the language .
In particular, we saw there that any object that satisfies
the open sentence "UFx" necessarily exists, and that any
name "a" to which we can validly instantiate that open sentence
must satisfy the condition "(Ex)N(x = a)", and not merely the
condition "(Ex)(x = a)".
By an argument similar to one just given, it can be seen
that sentences of the general form,
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(10) (Ex)(Ea)( A (a,x) & Tom B r ... a ),
are inadequate as analyses of sentences of the general form,
(11) There is something x such that Tom believes that* • • • -A- • • • •
(in (10), "B" is a dyadic predicate, to be read "believes".)
Let us assume the truth of
(12) (Ex)(A ("the oldest spy", x ) & Tom B rthe oldest spy is a spy"1 )
Hence
,
(13) (Ex)(Ea)(A( a_, x) & Tom B ra_ is a spy"1 )
is true, on our assumption. But
(14) There is someone x such that Tom believes that x is a spy
is false, if Tom has no belief concerning the identity of the
oldest spy.
Tom's having a belief about a thing's identity is, generally
speaking, the condition that must be fulfilled before we can
validly infer, on Kaplan's analysis, a sentence of the general
form (11).
I shall not explore the intricacies of Kaplan's attempts
to achieve philosophical clarity about this condition. But,
again, it is clear that the condition in question, which he
represents by
(15) (Ex) (Ea)R(ji, x,Tom)
has its analogue, in L^, in the form of the sentence,
(16) (Ex)(x = a & B^.(x = a)).
Kaplan explains ( 15 ) as follows:
... I will say £kj represents x to /Tom/ (symbolized:
/yR(ct,x,Tom )j|J7) if and only if (i) £aT_/ ienotes x,
(ii )~Va_7 is a name of x for ^om77 and (iii)
is sufficiently vivid. 7
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In the above account, (i) has Its analogous formal representation
in L
3
in the sentence "(Ex)(x = a)". The sentences are analogous
at best, for formulas of Lj contain no variables over names.
'
But talk of denotation can be replaced by talk of identity of
named objects, since "a" denotes x just in case a is identical
with X. (ii) and (iii) may be thought of as jointly represented
m Ly on the present analogy, by "(Ex)B
t
(x = a)". That is,
we may regard "(Ex)B
t
(x = a)" as true, just in case "a" is ’a
name of x for Tom, and "a” is Tom's vivid name of x.
In Hintikka's metaphor, "R(a,x,Tom)» can be thought of
as true, just in case a denotes x, and Tom has placed the
bearer of a among the leading characters of his inner story.
Exchanging one metaphor for another, we can say that "Ufa, x, Tom )"
is true, just in case a, refers to an object in this world and
in every world compatible with Tom's beliefs (where all worlds
compatible with Tom's beliefs comprise Tom's "inner story").
Contingent Identity
In the system L^, the theorem schema,
(12 ) r (x)(^)(x = £ D (Cc O f3))n , where x and £ are any individual
variables and ot and f2 are any wffs, and Cc and (3 differ only in that
in one or more places where Cc has free x, (3 has free
is valid; whereas the schema,
(^) (^)Oc D j3 , where x and ^ are any individual variables
and Cc and /3 are any wffs, and Oc and j3 differ only in that in every
place where Oc has free x, [3 has free £
(cf. (EGq)), is invalid. Consider a modal logic in which the
reverse is the case. The language is referentially opaque,
since the schema:
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(1) ra - b D (oc D /3)n , where a and b are any individual
constants and a and /3 are any wffs, and a and differ only in
that in one or more places where Cx. contains £, contains h
(cf. (SI
0 )), is invalid in the language. In such a language
,
the proof in Quine's hypothesized modal logic (Chapter IV, ^2)
is formally valid up to and including line 5:
(Ex)(Ey)(x = y • (N(x = morning star) • ~N(y = morning star))
But the contradiction in that proof is avoided, since, given
the non-theoremhood of (12), we cannot derive line 6:
(x)(y)(* = 7 D (N(x = morning star) D N(y = morning star))
In modal systems in which (12) is a theorem schema we can
derive the theorem:
(Nl) x = y D N(x = y)
which says, in effect, that all identities are necessary. It
is to block the derivation of this theorem and its contrapositive
that some logicians introduce a restriction on (12 ):
(Cl) r(x)(£)(x = v (qc D
^0)
)”1
,
where x and £ are any individual
variables and 0( and j
3
are any wffs differing only in that in one
or more places where Oe has free x, not occurring within the scope
of _a modal operator
, [3 has free
Modal systems in which (12) is not a theorem schema, but (Cl)
8is a theorem schema, are called "contingent identity" systems.
It seems to me—and I shall try to show it—that contingent
identity systems are conceived in sin: the sin of confusing
the semantical role of variables with that of constants.
Constants in L-^-L^, as is by now evident, play a semantical
role comparable to that of predicate letters. An n-ary predicate
letter is assigned a set of ordered n-tuples of members of I)
in a world; and it is possible that the set to which a predicate
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letter is assigned in some world v
±
is not identical with
the set to which it is assigned in another world w. (otherwise,
every atomic formula of the systems is logically true or
logically false). In a similar way, a constant is assigned
a member of Din a world; and it is possible that the individual
to which a constant is assigned in some world w. is not identical
with the individual to which it is assigned in another world
Wy But is a se rious confusion to suppose that variables
can play the role of constants. One consequence of such a
supposition is that some instances of quantification into
opaque contexts are either false (under customary interpretations
of syntax) or have some unintended sense, if intelligible.
Imagine a system in which
(M~I) (Ex)(By)(x = y & M~(x = y))
is formally consistent, and you have a contingent identity
system. Now try to imagine what (M~I) means. As we customarily
interpret quantifiers and variables, (M~I) asserts: "There
is something which is identical with itself, but it is possible
that it is not identical with itself." Clearly, the mind
boggles at such a reading. The plausible conclusion to draw,
in view of this mind-boggling reading of (M~l), is that this
is not the way the authors of contingent identity systems
read (M~l). But how do they read (M~l)?
Note that examples of so-called "contingent identities,"
which have led to the introduction of restrictions on (12),
are examples involving name
s
:
(2) The morning star is identical with the evening star,
but it is possible that the morning star is not identical
with the evening star,
120
( 3 ) The number of planets is identical with nine, but it
is possible that the number of planets is not identical
with nine,
and so on. Now note how these sentences, which have true
interpretations, differ from the following sentence, which
is false under any interpretation:
( 4 ) The morning star is identical with the evening star,
l^ut it is possible that the first—mentioned star is
not identical with the second-mentioned star.
What distinguishes (4) from (2) is antecedent reference back
(reference back to something referred to antecedently). This
is a feature of (4) as well as (M~l); and formalization of (4),
in L^, would take the form of
( 5 ) (Ex) (Ey ) (a = b& x= a& y = b& M~(x = y))
which of course implies (M~l).
Antecedent reference back is effected, in first-order
logic, by binding variables : The value of x in any free
occurrence outside the quantifier in any sentence of the form
r (Ex)C? is that antecedently referred to by the quantifier
r (Ex)”1 . When we truly assert (2), the second occurrences of
"the morning star" and "the evening star" are not occurrences
of antecedent references back. (2) is true, intuition dictates,
because "the morning star," in its second occurrence, need not
refer to the same object as that referred to by "the morning
star," in its first occurrence.
In some semantical theories for modal systems, this
intuitive way of looking at occurrences of names in modal
contexts is given formal implementation by having constants
assigned objects, in worlds, and allowing the possibility
of different assignments in different worlds. Now contingent
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identity systems make the same provision, but for variables
as well as constants. But, as I shall presently demonstrate,
you cannot (l) make assignments. to variables relative to worlds,
(2) allow the possibility of different assignments in different'
worlds, and (3) effect antecedent reference back on the part
of every variable occurring inside the scope of a modal operator
as well as inside a quantifier outside the scope of that operator.
A model-theoretic treatment of (M~I), like those developed
in this chapter, yields:
1 V
I
("(Ex)(Ey)(x = y & M~(x - y))“,w
i )
= 1 Assumption
2 V
If ("x = y L M~(x = y)",w..) =1 /i
3 VIf ("x = y
u
,w
i ) =1 /2
4 Vj.C-'M~(x = y)",w.) = 1 /2
5 Vj, ("~(x = y)",w..) = 1 /4
That is, I* assigns to »x" and "y" in w some element u of D,
and it is false that I' assigns to "x" and "y" in some world
Wj, where WjRw
,
some element u of D. Clearly, therefore,
we cannot read (M~l), given this formal interpretation, as
•'There is something which is identical with itself, but it
is possible that rt is not identical with itself for the
second occurrences of "x" and "y" do not have for their
values that individual which is the value of "x" and "y" in
their initial occurrences. Since, therefore, the quantifiers
"(Ex)" and "(Ey)" cannot bind every occurrence of "x" and "y"
in (M~l), the result of this treatment of variables is only
apparent binding of variables; and consequently it is doubtful
whether (M~l) makes any statement at all.
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CHAPTER SIX
IS THERE A REED FOR QUANTIFYING INTO OPAQUE CONTEXTS?:
A STUDY OF AN ARGUMENT OF HINTUCKA'S
$ 1 A Paradoxical Result
A good deal of attention has been given to the Question
whether quantification into referentially opaque contexts is
possible or not. No one to my knowledge, except Jaakko Hintikka,
has ever suggested that quantification into referentially opaque
contexts is sometimes necessary. The suggestion occurs in 6.7
of his book, Knowledge and Belief . 1 My aim in this section is
to ascertain, on the basis of that discussion, the conditions
under which this necessity is thought to exist.
From all indications, the author takes the following
conditions to be sufficient: the contexts are epistemic
(the contexts are governed by a phrase like "knows that");
and (trivially) we quantify into these contexts (a quantifier
outside the context binds a variable inside the context).
The line of reasoning is apparently this: It is necessary
that, if we quantify into epistemic contexts, then these
contexts are construed as referentially opaque, because the
alternative—construing these contexts as referentially
ptransparent—has the "paradoxical result" that
(1) Tom knows that the dictator of Portugal = the dictator
of Portugal
and
(2) The dictator of Portugal = Salazar
imply
(3) Tom knows that the dictator of Portugal = Salazar,
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and (3) implies
(4) (Ex) (Tom knows that the dictator of Portugal = x ),
an inference which is invalid, from an intuitive point of view.
"It follows that no one can help knowing who Portugal's dictator
is as soon as one knows that Portugal is a dictatorship."^
(Hintikka's interpretation of these sentences needs to be
examined with some casre
,
but I reserve such an examination
for §2.) The necessity in question is thus a semantical
necessity.
On the basis of what I find given, I shall assume that
the proposition urged by Hintikka is the following:
(A ) is (semantically) necessary that, if we quantify
into epistemic contexts, then these contexts are
construed as referentially opaque.
I would stress my belief that there is, however, at best
a suggestion of an argument for (a). That there is an argument
is suggested by the fact that Hintikka's discussion is entitled,
"The necessity of quantifying into opaque contexts;" yet I find
no set of statements within this discussion which could be
identified as an argument for this necessity.
An argument that does explicitly occur on these pages
has as its conclusion that W. V. Quine's account, which allows
only quantification into referentially transparent contexts,
is unacceptable, for the reason that this account allows the
inference from (1), taken transparently, and ( 2 ) to ( 4 ).
Indeed, Hintikka's purpose in this section seems to be to
reveal a difficulty for Quine's proposals, which is not a
difficulty for his own approach. Now if we suppose that
the section under consideration lives up to its title, we
naturally seek to make explicit those premises that validly
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imply the necessity of doing epistemic logic in, essentially,
Hintikka's way. But the only relevant information we are
given is that something is wrong with a certain account
according to which we may quantify only into referentially
transparent contexts and that no fault can he found with the
author's own approach. It is apparent, then, that Hintikka—
if he does presume to have shown the necessity in question—
presupposes that the difficulty he imputes to Quine's treatment
is a difficulty for any treatment allowing only quantification
into referentially transparent contexts.
This presupposition is however not true, as I am sure
Hintikka now realizes. The line of argument used by him
against Quine cannot be used against a treatment of epistemic
contexts in which only a restricted class of referring expressions
count as interpretations of the set of individual constants of
the system. These referring expressions satisfy rather special
semantical conditions. In particular, satisfaction of these
conditions is intended to ensure the intuitive validity of
the rules (SIQ ) and (EGq ) in the system. All other referring
expressions, save pronouns, are treated as definite descriptions
and eliminated.
An example of an epistemic system with such restricted
individual constants, as we might call them, has been proposed
by Dagfinn Follesdal. ^ A "name-like expression"
_a is a genuine
name, Follesdal says, only if it satisfies the condition:
r (Ey)K
a
(x)(xa's = x = y) n , where »K" is an epistemic
operator and _a is a variable over name—like expressions
(presumably, all proper nouns and descriptive phrases)
As Hintikka has interpreted this condition, ^ interpretations
of individual constants in Follesdal' s system name only those
individuals known to ja. This is surely a correct interpretation,
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and this restriction on vocabulary is precisely what is semantically
required for substitution and generalization inside the scope
of epistemic operators, if restrictions are not placed elsewhere
(namely, as per Hintikka, in the substitution and generalization
rules )
.
But this restriction at the same time disallows the inference
required by Hintikka* s argument; for that argument presupposes
that any referring expression, as long as it has a unique reference,
may be treated as an individual constant. But if Tom does not
rcnow who Salazar is, then "Salazar" is not an individual constant
in (2), open to substitutions and upon which we may generalize.
This does not preclude the possibility that (3) and (4)
are otherwise inferable from (l) and (2). Given Hintikka'
s
peculiar interpretation of (1) and Russell and Quine's procedure
for eliminating descriptions, hidden and unhidden, recommended
by Follesdal, ordinary quantification laws applied to the
unabbreviated forms of (1) through (4) are sufficient to yield
the inference. (The proof is sketched in my footnote 9.)
But this inference is not open to Hintikka' s objection of
intuitive invalidity, as will become clear, I believe, when
we examine Hintikka' s interpretation in ^2.
Of course, the idea of placing semantical conditions on
one's syntax in order to ensure the validity (SIQ ) and (EG^)
is not new. It was suggested, if not advocated, by Church
in 1943;^ and the idea was adopted by some modal logicians
as a partial solution to some famous problems raised by
Quine (as reviewed in Chapter IV). The formal similarities
between "names" in Follesdal 's epistemic system and those
"proper names" of the earlier modal systems of Smullyan,
Barcan, Fitch, and others, should be apparent.
What matters in all of this, for my immediate aims, is
that, since not all treatments allowing only quantification
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into referentially transparent contexts are open to Hintikka's
objection, the line of argument used by him against Quine's
position does not support an argument for the proposition
I originally took Eintikka to be urging.
However, Hmtikka may have proved the need for quantifying
into referentially opaque contexts, when a system satisfies,
in addition to the conditions given in (a), the condition that
at least one epistemic context of the system is a construction
on a normal individual constant; where by a "normal" individual
constant it is meant that an interpretation of the constant
fulfills only the normal condition of being a referring expression
which has a unique reference. For "Salazar", in (3), is suitable
as an interpretation of an individual constant in such a system:
(3) is an epistemic context; and, finally, if epistemic contexts
in (1) through (4) are referentially transparent, then one does
get the inference from (1) and (2) to ( 4 ) by substituting and
generalizing on Salazar". Furthermore, it is clear from his
WI*iiinSs that Quine does treat referring expressions which have
unique references as individual constants. And even if he
did not, we could hypothesize such a treatment.
Accordingly, I shall suppose that the proposition urged
by Eintikka is the following:
(B) It is (semantically) necessary that, for any epistemic
context ^_a, if a is a normal individual constant and
we quantify into ^a^, then ^_a is construed as referentially
opaque
.
I further suppose that Quine's position is that we may
quantify into epistemic contexts that are constructions on
normal individual constants, as long as these contexts are
construed as referentially transparent.
On these suppositions, I shall show in the following section
that Hintikka has not proved this need either.
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§ 2 Eliminating the Paradox
Quine's preference for normal constants over restricted
restricted constants influenced an analysis of contexts of
propositional attitude (in "Quantifiers and Propositional
Attitudes" 7 ), according to which constants have to he outside
modalized areas in a sentence. (Quine uses, instead of
operators, special parentheses or brackets to depict, by
enclosure, modalized areas in a sentence.) Although a
referentially transparent treatment of said contexts does
not rule out the possibility that all constants occur inside
modalized areas if one is willing to countenance a restricted
class of constants— I find Quine's procedure to be, mutatis
mutandis
,
perhaps, one possible treatment among others.
In what follows I outline the manner in which I defend this
claim against Hintikka's challenge. In what follows I shall
also treat "the dictator of Portugal" as a name and hence
an individual constant, for Hintikka's line of argument is
unaffected and is made simpler by this provision.
Hintikka's argument may now be put as follows: Quine's
account is unacceptable, for the reason that it allows the
inference from (1) to (4), and this inference is intuitively
invalid.
But it is not obvious that the inference from ( 1 ) to (4)
is intuitively invalid, if (1) is construed as referentially
transparent. Therefore, another argument, for the intuitive
invalidity of the inference, is required to sustain the first
argument. This argument, which has been clarified considerably
in Hintikka's paper, "Partially Transparent Senses of Knowing,"
may be put as follows:
(a) Construed as referentially transparent, (l) is true
as soon as Tom knows of the individual who in fact is the
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dictator of Portugal that he is self-identical.
(b) Construed as referentially transparent
, (1) implies (4).
(o) But (4) is not true as soon as Tom knows of some
individual or other that he is self-identical (for (4) is true
only if Tom knows of some individual or other that he is the
dictator of Portugal
; in other words, (4) i s true only if
Tom knows who the dictator of Portugal is).
Therefore, the inference from (1), construed as referentially
transparent, to (4) is invalid.
I shall argue that this argument is unsound—that if ( a )
is true, then (c) is false; that if (c) is true, then (a) is
false. I shall proceed by assuming the truth of (a).
According to Hintikka, the sentence
( 1 ) Tom knows that the dictator of Portugal = the dictator
of Portugal
has a referentially transparent sense which we might call
informative
. (This italicized term is my own, but
it is drawn, derivatively, from phrases used in the same or
relevantly similar connections by Hintikka and Quine.) I shall
not attempt to define this italicized term but will mention
only what is pertinent; namely, that, according to Hintikka,
in an analysis of (1), in its trivially informative referentially
transparent sense, no individual constant occurs within the
scope of the operator, "knows that." Hintikka characterizes
what he takes to be this sense of (1) by
( 5 ) (Ex)(x = d & Tom knows that (x = x))
(intuitively, "Tom knows of the individual who in fact is the
dictator of Portugal that he is self-identical"). This sense
is called by Hintikka (in the paper to which I just referred)
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the "totally transparent" sense of (l), by which he means
that both occurrences of "the dictator of Portugal" in (l),
on this interpretation, are outside the scope of "knows that."
The possibility of such a reading perhaps never occurred
to Quine (perhaps still does not); but what I am more interested
m pointing out is that, supposing there is such a sense of (l),
we can obtain an equally effective characterization of that
sense using Quine's abstraction notation for monadic intensions
or attributes. Thus:
(6) Tom knows z/z = z] of d
The normal, or "partially transparent," reading of (l) is
characterized by Hintikka as
(7) (Ex)(x = d & Tom knows that (x = d))
(intuitively, "Tom knows of the individual who in fact is the
dictator of Portugal that he is the dictator of Portugal").
But this sense, again, is characterizable equally well in
Quine's notation by
(8) Tom knows z/z = d7 of d
The upshot of Hintikka' s argument is that, in Quine's
treatment, we may infer a not trivially informative (hereafter,
"informative") existential statement
(9) (Ex)(Tom knows that d = x)
(by the rule (EG
q ))
from a trivially informative (hereafter,
"uninformative") statement
(10) Tom knows that d = d,
where both occurrences of "d" in (10) are transparent.
But it is not clear that ( 9 ) is. informative, if "d" occurs
transparently in (9); for (9) seems to be an abbreviated form ,
much as (10) is.
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If there is a deficiency here at all, it is that Quine's
analysis is not so fine-grained as Hintikka's. (i know of no
place where Quine discusses the possibility of totally transparent
readings of the kind exemplified in (10). ) But this is not
a deficiency in the rules of inference, as can easily be seen.
Suppose we have differentiated the uninformative from the
informative transparent readings of sentences like (l) in the
manner of (6) and (8), respectively, which correspond to
Hintikka's (5) and (7), respectively. Then existential
generalization with respect to occurrences of "d" in (6) and
(8) takes us from the uninformative to the uninformative
(11) (Ex) (Tom knows z/z = £7 of x),
and from the informative to the informative
(12) (Ex) (Tom knows z/z = dj of x),
exactly as desired. (Exactly analogous existential statements
are inferable in Hintikka's system from (5) and (7).) 9
I conclude that Hintikka's analysis of (1) through ( 4 )
does not support an argument for (B). Nor do I find any
feasible alternative to (B). It is of course true that if
there are circumstances under which an intuitively invalid
inference is admissible by and only by construing contexts
in one of two alternative ways, then there is a need for
construing these contexts the other way. But I submit that
Hintikka has failed to indicate the circumstances under which
any views of those who allow only quantification into referentially
transparent contexts imply the admissibility of an intuitively
invalid inference.^
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI
Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief fT+.v^^r,
Cornell University Presif 1962 ). uxnaca, N.Y.
:
in VniJw0 "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes"jjgj_els for modal it is
s
(New York: Humanities Press, 1969)
pp. 97-9o, wherein the argument reappears essentially unaltered.
^Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief
,
op
. crt.
,
p. 143 .
Dagfinn Follesdal, "Knowledge, Identity, and Existence,"Theona
, 33 (1967), pp. 1-27-
5Jaakko Hintikka, "Existence and Identity in Epistemic
Contexts: A Comment on Follesdal's Paper," Theoria, 33 (1967)
pp. 138-147.
*
’ ~
’
Alonzo Church, Review of Quine's "Notes on Existence and
Necessity," Journal of Symbolic Logic
,
8 (1943), pp. 45-47 .
7W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes"
in The^ Hays of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. I83-I 94 .
8
Jaakko Hintikka, "Partially Transparent Senses of Knowing"
Philosophical Studies
, 20 (1969), pp. 4-8 .
9An alternative version of the inference is obtainable in
Follesdal's system. (l) becomes:
(Ex)((y)(Dy - y = x) • (Ez)((y)(Dy = y = z) • K
t
(x = z)))
( 2 ) becomes:
(Ex)((y)(Dy = y = x) • (Ez)((y)(Sy = y = z) • x = z))
and ( 3 ) becomes:
(Ex)((y)(Dy = y = x) • (Ez)((y)(Sy = y = z) • K
t
(x = z)))
But the inference from (l) and ( 2 ) to (3), by ordinary quantification
laws, is unobjectionable. Finally, ( 4 ) becomes:
(Ex)((Ez)((y)(Dy = y = z) • K
t
(x = z)))
which is inferable directly from (l), the inference being
equally unobjectionable:
Assume: (y)(Dy = y = u) • (Ez)((y)(Dy = y = z) • K. (u = z))
(Ez)((y)(Dy = y = z) . K (u = z))
(Ex)( (Ez)((y)(Dy = y = zj • Kt (x = z)))
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It would have been quite impossible for me to have assessedthis argument as I have without benefit of the illuminating
exohanges between Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. ("A Note on an Ar4entof Hintikka s, Philosophical Studies
, 18 (1967) pp . 12-14-and "On a Proposed System of Epistemic Logic," Nous 9 H Qi^P >
PP. 396-398) and ( "Partially Tra^Lef^nliT ’’
Knowing, o£. cit
. )
,
in which this argument is discussed.
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